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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and assess factors that predict the 
performance of junior officers in the operating forces of the U.S. Marine Corps. In this 
analysis, fitness report scores are used as indicators of performance.  We concentrate on 
the effect of performance at The Basic School (TBS) and other demographic 
characteristics on fitness report scores. The data used in this analysis includes 
information on all officers who were newly commissioned between 1998 and 2005, TBS 
performance data for these same cohorts, and fitness report data for TBS graduates.     
The results of this analysis find that several factors predict officer performance as 
indicated by fitness report scores.  All aspects of TBS performance are important in 
predicting future success. However, we find that leadership scores at TBS have the 
strongest impact on performance in the operating forces.  Also, officers who are prior 
enlisted, married, or female have higher fitness report scores, whereas blacks have lower 
scores.  We also find that officers who finish TBS in the top third of their TBS company 
receive higher average fitness report scores than officers who finish in the middle third; 
conversely, officers in the bottom third of their TBS class receive lower fitness report 
scores than those in the middle third.  Lastly, we find that whether officers receive their 
preferred MOS assignment has little effect on their performance as a junior officer.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
All officer candidates entering the Marine Corps do not attend Officer Candidate 
School (OCS), and those officers who do attend don’t necessarily go through the same 
program.  However, every newly commissioned officer attends The Basic School (TBS) 
in Quantico, VA.  While at TBS each newly commissioned officer goes through the 
rigorous six-month training course called the Basic Officer’s Course (BOC).  This course 
exemplifies the motto, “Every Marine a Rifleman,” as it provides every officer with skills 
and experiences common to all Marines including both officers and enlisted personnel.  
This course also reinforces core officer competencies including leadership, officership, 
responsibility, accountability, field craft, decision making, problem solving, and warrior 
ethos.   Furthermore, the BOC prepares officers for follow-on training at their military 
occupational specialty (MOS) schools and subsequent assignment to a company grade 
officer billet in the operating forces.   The stated mission of The Basic School is: 
Train and educate newly commissioned or appointed officers in the high 
standards of professional knowledge, esprit-de-corps, and leadership 
required to prepare them for duty as company grade officers in the 
operating forces, with particular emphasis on the duties, responsibilities 
and warfighting skills required of a rifle platoon commander. (TBS 
website 2007) 
While attending TBS, officers undergo hundreds of hours of instruction both in 
the classroom and in the “field.” Upon completion of various periods of instruction, 
officers are required to take written examinations and practical application examinations, 
and also to apply what they’ve learned during training exercises in a tactical field 
environment. 
An officer student’s overall grade is a composite of three “weighted and graded” 
areas of evaluation.  These areas of evaluation are Leadership, Academics, and Military 
Skills.  The officers of each company are then ranked, in lineal order, from highest 
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overall grade to lowest overall grade.  The overall grades are the basis on which officers 
with the same commissioning date are then assigned lineal numbers.  An officer’s lineal 
number will determine when he or she is promoted in relation to other officers with the 
same commissioning date that have been selected for promotion. 
According to the Marine Corps Promotion Manual, a promotion is “not 
considered a reward for past performance but as an incentive to reach the next higher 
grade.”  Factors such as potential (based on past performance), appearance, professional 
military education, experience, Title 10 requirements, and vacancies all help to determine 
if an officer is qualified and will be promoted.  However, an officer’s performance at 
TBS, as indicated by his or her lineal standing, is the factor that determines when an 
officer is promoted to the selected grade.  An officer with a lower lineal number will be 
promoted prior to an officer with a higher lineal number.  Since it typically takes an 
entire fiscal year to promote all officers selected for promotion, this spread in lineal 
numbers can mean a large differential in promotion times for individuals sharing the 
same date of commission.   
This system creates an interesting situation when one considers that performance 
at The Basic School may not be necessarily predictive of performance in the Operating 
Forces.  An officer who performed marginally at The Basic School but has consistently 
out-performed his or her peers in the operating forces will likely always lag behind an 
officer who performed exceptionally at TBS but performed only marginally in the fleet, 
assuming these officers share the same commissioning date.  Since performance at TBS 
plays such an influential role in the promotion system, especially early in an officers’ 
career, it is imperative that the Marine Corps make an informed decision regarding the 
evaluation system being used at The Basic School to rank officers. 
Further, an analysis of the correlation between performance at TBS and 
performance in the operating forces will provide information as to the effectiveness of the 
MOS assignment process currently in use at The Basic School, known as the “Quality 
Spread.”  The Quality Spread is the process by which ground assignable students are 
divided into thirds based on their respective company lineal standing, at a certain point in 
the Program of Instruction.  HQ, USMC (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) will then 
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provide each BOC company a distribution of ground assignable MOSs, which will then 
be equally (to the greatest extent possible) divided into thirds also.  Students are then 
assigned an MOS based on their preferences, and MOS availability in each “third.”  This 
process is accomplished using an optimization program called “My MOS." 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the correlation between the performance 
of officers at TBS and their performance in the operating forces. This work includes an 
analysis of fitness reports for all newly commissioned officers post-1998 when changes 
to the Performance Evaluation System went into effect.  This thesis will also analyze the 
three areas in which students are evaluated at TBS to determine which, if any, of these 
three areas are most predictive of future performance in the Operating Forces.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. The Primary Research Question 
What is the relationship between the weighted/graded areas at The Basic School 
(Leadership, Academics, Military Skills) and "success" in the operating forces as 
measured by fitness report scores? 
2. The Secondary Research Questions 
What is the relationship between the student's final lineal standing at TBS and 
his/her success in the operating forces? 
Are individuals with certain background characteristics predisposed to being more 
successful in the operating forces?  
Is the Quality Spread the most effective tool for assigning MOSs from The Basic 
School?   
Is the Staff Platoon Commander doing an adequate job of evaluating student 
officers?  
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D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide the Marine Corps with the statistical basis from which to 
analyze its current evaluation process at The Basic School.  It will also provide the basis 
from which to determine if the current officer MOS assignment process (the Quality 
Spread) is effective, or even necessary.  It will also provide insight as to whether or not 
the leadership evaluation process used by Staff Platoon Commanders is accurate and in 
consonance with the officer’s future performance in the Operating Forces. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis analyzes the relationship between officers’ performance at TBS and 
their performance in the Operating Forces, using data on Marine Corps officers 
commissioned from 1998-2005.  The study will include a reexamination of The Basic 
School’s grading breakdown/criteria, quality spread/MOS assignment system, selection 
and assignment to Staff Platoon Commander (SPC), and the Marine Corps performance 
evaluation system.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized into seven chapters.  Chapter II will provide an overview 
of TBS and the Marine Corps officer performance evaluation system.  In Chapter III we 
will review literature from previous studies on Marine officer performance, and on the 
relationship between PMOS and promotion, and on the MOS assignment process.  
Chapter IV provides a preliminary analysis and discussion of data used for the statistical 
analysis (drawn from TBS, MMEA, and the Center for Naval Analyses).  Chapter V 
discusses the research methodology and estimating, models and the statistical results.  
Chapter VI concludes by summarizing the conclusions and offering recommendations 
based on the statistical results. 
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II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC SCHOOL, THE MARINE 
CORPS PROMOTION SYSTEM, AND THE MARINE CORPS 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM  
This chapter describes TBS, the Marine Corps’ officer promotion system, the 
Marine Corps’ Performance Evaluation System (PES), and the various Marine Corps 
commissioning programs.  The Basic School is a post-commissioning training program 
that is unique to the military. All officers entering any of the four services are required to 
attend Basic School, and they receive the same post-commissioning training, regardless 
of their military occupational specialty (MOS).  
A. COMMISSIONING PROGRAMS 
There are seven different commissioning programs for Marine Corps officers: 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC), United States Naval Academy 
(USNA), Platoon Leader Course (PLC), Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program 
(MECEP), Officer Candidate Course (OCC), Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP), 
and the Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP).  Each program differs in length, 
number of candidates, entrance requirements, and depth of exposure to Marine Corps 
officer culture. Ergun (2003) and Finley (2002) provide detailed explanations of each 
program in their thesis.  We will discuss the major features of each program. 
1. Naval Reserve Officer Training Course 
The NROTC Marine option program is open to U.S. citizens, ages 17 to 23,1 who 
possess a high school diploma or General Education Development (GED), and have a 
qualifying score of 1000 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or 22 on the American 
College Test (ACT).  A maximum percentage of 16 2/3 of all NROTC graduates can 
                                                 
1Applicants must not have reached their 27th birthday by June 30th of the year in which college 
graduation and commissioning are anticipated.  Applicants who have prior active duty military service may 
be eligible for age adjustments for the amount of time equal to their prior service, on a month-for-month 
basis, for a maximum of 36 months, provided they do not reach their 30th birthday by June 30th of the year 
in which graduation and commissioning are anticipated. 
(https://www.marines.usmc.mil/G3/Officer/nrotcrequirement.htm, 22 March 2008). 
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select the Marine option.  The NROTC program offers both scholarship and non-
scholarship opportunities at more than 150 colleges and universities throughout the 
United States.  Scholarship students receive full tuition and fees, a book stipend, 
uniforms, and a monthly allowance.  Upon commissioning, they incur an eight-year 
service obligation, in which four years must be served on active duty.  Non-scholarship 
students receive uniforms and a stipend during their last two years of college.  Much like 
the scholarship students, they incur an eight-year service obligation; however, they are 
only required to serve 3½ years on active duty.     
Along with their normal academic workload, NROTC midshipmen attend naval 
science classes that familiarize them with various aspects of military culture.  Throughout 
the year midshipmen attend training events with their NROTC unit and the Marine Corps 
operational forces.  Lastly, these midshipmen attend “Bulldog”  –  a six-week course at 
OCS that screens and evaluates Marine Corps officer candidates.  
2. United States Naval Academy  
The Naval Academy is the undergraduate university of the naval service.  It 
focuses on providing midshipmen the academic and professional training needed to be 
successful naval and marine officers.  The Naval Academy is open to all single, United 
States citizens, ages 17 to 23, who are not pregnant, and have no dependents.  USNA is 
highly selective; each year approximately 10,000 applicants seek admission into USNA 
and, of those, only about 1,200 are accepted.   
Life as a midshipman at the Naval Academy is rigorous.  Students undergo tightly 
structured academic education and military training.  Life at the Naval Academy starts 
with a seven-week indoctrination program.  At the end of each academic year 
midshipmen attend various training programs designed to increase proficiency in military 
skills, leadership abilities, and experience.  Up to 20 percent of each graduating class 
from the Naval Academy can select the Marine Corps option.  USNA graduates have a 
minimum service obligation of five years of active duty and three years in reserve status.    
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3. Platoon Leader Course  
The PLC program is open to all full-time college freshmen, sophomores, or 
juniors attending an accredited college or university.  Students must be U.S. citizens, 
have a least a 2.0 GPA, and a minimum qualifying score on one of the following tests: 
1000 SAT score, 45 ACT score, or 74 QT score on the Armed Service Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).   The program is designed to allow students to join the 
Marine Corps without interrupting their academic study. 
Students who enroll during their freshman or sophomore year attend two six-week 
OCS sessions while student who enroll during their junior year attend one ten-week 
session.  Those enrolled in the PLC program are not required to serve on active duty until 
they graduate.  Once they graduate, they must fulfill eight years of service, at least three 
years of which should be on active duty.      
4. Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program  
MECEP is open to all personnel of the regular Marine Corps, who are U.S. 
citizens, ages 20 to 26, in the grade of corporal or above.  Those applying must have 
graduated in the top 50 percent of their high school class or, if non-high school graduates, 
have at least 3 years of high school and a score of at least 75 percent in each area of the 
GED.  Applicants must also have a minimum SAT score of 1000 or an EL score of 115 
or greater.  MECEP is designed to give qualifying enlisted Marines the opportunity to 
become officers.  Marines accepted into the program attend a college or university with 
an NROTC unit as a full time student.  These marines receive full pay and benefits while 
in the program and remain eligible for promotion.  Unlike midshipmen, MECEP students 
must pay for tuition, books, fees, housing, and living expenses.  MECEP students attend 
training events with their NROTC unit and also attend the six-week “Bulldog” program 
at OCS after their first year of school.  Upon acceptance into the program MECEP 
students must reenlist for six years.  Once they graduate and are commissioned they incur 
a four-year service obligation.  
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5. Officer Candidate Course  
OCC is designed to provide college seniors and those with college degrees the 
opportunity to become Marine Corps officers.  The eligibility requirements are similar to 
the PLC program.  Individuals accepted into the program attend a ten-week OCS course 
and upon completion of this course receive a commission as a second lieutenant in the 
Marine Corps.   
6. Enlisted Commissioning Program  
ECP provides active duty and active reserve Marines who possess a four-year 
degree the opportunity to become commissioned officers in the Marine Corps.   Once 
accepted to the program, Marines are sent to the ten-week training course at OCS.  Upon 
graduation they are commissioned as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps.    
7. Meritorious Commissioning Program 
MCP allows exceptionally qualified Marines who do not posses a bachelor’s 
degree the opportunity to become officers.  Candidates are nominated by their 
commanding officer and must be approved by a selection board.  To be eligible for the 
program Marines must have at least 75 hours of college work or an associate’s degree.  
Once selected, Marines attend the ten-week Officer Candidate Course at OCS.  Once they 
graduate, they are commissioned as second lieutenants.  Officers in this program must 
complete their bachelor’s degree before the end of their obligated service to remain 
eligible for future promotion. 
B. THE BASIC SCHOOL 
Once commissioned, all officers attend TBS at Quantico, Virginia.  While at TBS, 
officers attend The Basic Officer Course (BOC), which is an intensive 26-week program 
of instruction where officers are schooled in five main areas: leadership, military skills, 
decision making and problem solving, and an introduction to the study of military history 
and warrior ethos.   The mission of TBS is:  
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Train and educate newly commissioned or appointed officers in the high 
standards of professional knowledge, esprit-de-corps, and leadership 
required to prepare them for duty as company grade officers in the 
operating forces, with particular emphasis on the duties, responsibilities 
and warfighting skills required of a rifle platoon commander. (TBS 
Command Brief, www.tecom.usmc.mil/tbs, 17 January 2008) 
By the time an officer graduates the BOC, the staff at TBS expects to have a 
“Marine officer who is: A man or woman of exemplary character, devoted to leading 
Marines twenty-four/seven, able to decide communicate and act, a warfighter, mentally 
and physically tough.” (TBS Command Brief, www.tecom.usmc.mil/tbs, 17 January 
2008) 
TBS has eight companies, six of which are dedicated to training newly 
commissioned officers.  Each company trains approximately 200 officers each year, and 
there is a two-month gap between the start of each company’s training cycle.  Each 
company has a Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Company Gunnery Sergeant, 
and six Staff Platoon Commanders (SPC), one for each of the six platoons. The 
Commanding Officer of each company is typically a major and reports to the 
commanding officer of TBS, who is typically a colonel.  Along with the student 
companies, there is an Instructor Battalion that consists of several companies dedicated to 
supporting the training and education of the officers in the Basic Officer Course.  
Instructor Battalion also provides the Marines and equipment to logistically support the 
training in the BOCs. 
The BOC uses several phases to teach topics to students.  Each phase builds upon 
the last phase to ensure officers receive thorough information, have ample time to study a 
topic, and receive various points of view from different instructors.  Lessons begin in a 
classroom environment, then move to a sand table, hands on exercises, and/or small 
group discussion, and typically culminate with a field exercise.  There are a total of 1585 
training hours.  Sixty percent of training time, or 933 hours, are spent in the classroom, 
and 40% of training time, or 652 hours, is spent in the “field” (TBS Command Brief, 
www.tecom.usmc.mil/tbs, 17 Jan 2008). 
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Instruction at TBS is focused on three main areas: maneuver warfare theory and 
practice, tactics, techniques and procedures, and officership.  Officership includes ethics, 
human factors of leadership, communication and decision-making, mental and physical 
toughness as well as bias for action training.  The period of instruction is, “infantry 
centric…combat oriented, and reflects timeless infantry skills and [the] current combat 
environment.” (TBS command Brief, www.tecom.usmc.mil/tbs, 17 Jan 2008) 
Instruction is also broken down into four phases that build upon one another.  
Phase one is seven weeks in length and lays the foundation for students by developing 
individual skills.  Phase two, rifle squad leadership skills, is six weeks.  This phase moves 
from inward development to leadership and employment of a squad size element.  Phase 
three, rifle platoon commander skills, is six weeks long and focuses on developing an 
officer’s ability to command a platoon, which is the size of unit a lieutenant will normally 
lead after graduating from TBS and his follow-on MOS school. Phase four is seven 
weeks long and provides instruction on basic Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
officer skills.       
Students are evaluated on their ability and skill in three main areas: military skills, 
academics, and leadership.  Military skills make up 32 percent of a student’s grade and 
include physical training events, such as the endurance and double-obstacle courses, 
tactical decision making exams, weapons qualification, and practical application exams. 
Academics account for 32 percent of a student’s final grade.  A student’s academic score 
is comprised of his or her score on ten cumulative written examinations that cover topics 
from amphibious operations to writing skills.  The last graded area, leadership, comprises 
36 percent of a student’s grade. Students are evaluated throughout their time in the BOC; 
they receive two command leadership evaluations, numerous garrison and tactical billet 
evaluations, and several peer evaluations.  The first leadership evaluation accounts for 
14% of the student’s overall grade.  The second leadership evaluation accounts for 22% 
of the overall grade.  The Staff Platoon Commander assigns 90% of the leadership grade 
by ranking the officers in his platoon from first to last.  An officer’s fellow students 
account for the remaining 10% of the leadership grade by completing “Peer Evaluations.”  
For the first leadership evaluation, Peer Evaluations are completed by officers of the 
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same squad.  For second leadership evaluation, Peer Evaluations are completed by all the 
officers of the platoon.  For example, if Second Lieutenant Jones is in first squad, and 
there are 12 other officers in that squad, the other 12 officers will complete peer 
evaluations of Second Lieutenant Jones for first leadership evaluation.  The officer does 
not complete a peer evaluation of himself. 
At the time of MOS assignment, there are only a certain number of weighted and 
graded events that are completed.  Notably, First Leadership Evaluation is completed, but 
Second Leadership Evaluation is not.  The number of events that are completed is not 
necessarily the same for each BOC company.  A lineal standing of the students is created 
based on the events that are completed and entered into the system.    In order to ensure 
there are quality officers throughout the entire MOS spectrum, the class is divided into 
thirds (top, middle, bottom) and vacancies in available MOSs are distributed among each 
third.  The Marine Corps refers to this process as “The Quality Spread.”  Officers can 
only compete for vacancies in MOSs that are available in their third. For example, 
suppose an officer in the top third selects an MOS as his top choice, but the five 
vacancies for that MOS in that third are already distributed; therefore, the officer is 
assigned the next highest MOS on his list that is still available.  TBS currently uses an 
optimization program, called MY MOS, to accomplish the task of matching ground 
assignable officers to an MOS preference so that the company can achieve the highest 
percent of officers assigned to a top 5 MOS preference as possible. 
At the conclusion of the BOC officers have earned a GPA based on their 
performance in the three graded areas.  Students are then ordered and assigned a final 
TBS class rank based on their overall GPA.   A student’s final class standing will have a 
significant and lasting impact on their career.  Headquarters Marine Corps assigns a 
precedence number to all Marines graduating from TBS based on their date of rank2 and 
                                                 
2 Second lieutenants commissioned between 1 May and 30 June of each year have a date of rank of 
first commission the same as that for the U.S. Naval Academy graduating class for that year.  
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their final class standing.3 This lineal number affects an officer’s seniority, which in turn 
impacts eligibility for promotion, “Initial assignment and maintenance of lineal 
precedence affects each officer’s seniority, provides the sole basis for determining an 
officer’s eligibility for promotion, and drives the timing of the officer’s promotion once 
selected” (MCBUL 1400, July 07).  Since the officer’s lineal precedence depends solely 
on his/her performance at The Basic School (among officers with the same date of 
commission), we assume that TBS performance will have a lasting impact on an officer’s 
career. 
C. MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM 
In order to remain in service it is necessary that an officer continue to be 
promoted throughout his or her career.  Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 
1980 (DOPMA) established and regulates promotion flow points throughout the armed 
forces.  The Marine Corps officer flow points are well established and fall within 
DOPMA’s regulations.  Figure 1shows typical promotion flow points for Marine Corps 
officers for grades O-3 through O-6. 
 
 
                                                 
3 “Precedence numbers are assigned to all second lieutenants, including graduates of a service 
academy, according to the order of their overall class average (expressed to the nearest thousandth of a 
percent) at The Basic School. In the event of a tie, officers are ranked among themselves according to their 
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Figure 1.   .Marine Corps Officer Promotion Flow Points 
 (Source: From HQMC MMOA FY-08 Road Show Brief 2007) 
Unlike the Marine Corps enlisted promotion system, the officer promotion system 
does not promote based on PMOS.  Instead, officers are promoted based on who is 
believed to be the best and most fully qualified.  According to the Marine Corps 
Promotions Manual, 
Officers are selected for promotion for their potential to carry out the 
duties and responsibilities of the next higher grade based upon past 
performance as indicated in their official military personnel file. 
Promotions should not be considered a reward for past performance, but as 
incentive to excel in the next higher grade.     
While many officers may possess the potential to perform in the next higher 
grade, it is necessary that a vacancy exist in order to promote an officer.  Even still, the 
Marine Corps promotion system is based on law.  Regulations are set that determine the 
conduct, scope, and timing of promotions.  These regulations exist in Title 10, DOPMA, 
Marine Corps Order P1400.31.C, and various other SECNAV instructions, and Marine 
Corps bulletins, directives, and messages.   Grade tables in Title 10 specifically outline 
the number of officers authorized, major through colonel, in each service at the end of the 
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fiscal year.4  Table 1 shows the maximum number of majors, lieutenant colonels, and 
colonels that may be serving on active duty at the end of the fiscal year. 
Table 1.   DOPMA officer strength and distribution in grade  
Marine Corps Officer Major Lieutenant Colonel Colonel 
10,000            2,525      1,480                  571 
12,500          2,900     1,600                  632 
15,000  3,275      1,720                  653 
17,500         3,650      1,840                  673 
20,000            4,025      1,960                  694 
22,500           4,400      2,080                  715 
25,000           4,775      2,200            735 
     (Source: Title 10, Armed Forces Section Jan 8, 2004) 
 
The Marine Corps officer promotion process can be separated in to three time 
frames: pre-board, during board, and post-board processes.  During each time frame, 
specific activities take place such as publishing directives and messages, establishing 
promotion zones, setting criteria for promotion, selecting officers for promotion, and 
releasing promotion board results.  
During the pre-board process, the Marine Corps Manpower Plans and Policy 
Division (MPP) develops the promotion plan that is used to determine eligibility, zone 
sizes, and selection opportunities for promotion.  According to the Marine Corps 
promotion manual (MCO P1400.31B, 2006), there are five factors taken into 
consideration in developing the promotion plan: 
(a) The number of requirements needed to meet the projected vacancies by 
grade. 
(b) The estimated number of officers needed to fill vacancies during the 
period in which it is anticipated that the officers selected for promotion 
will be promoted and the number of officers authorized by Secretary of the 
Navy to serve in the grade and competitive category under consideration.  
                                                 
4 The number of officers who may be serving on active duty in each of the grades of major, lieutenant 
colonel, and colonel may not, as of the end of such fiscal year, exceed a number determined in accordance 
with table 1 (Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 32, Sec. 523 February 14 2008). 
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(c) The impact of zone size and promotion opportunity on time-in-service 
promotion flow points to the next higher grade. 
(d) Critically short MOSs requiring skill guidance in the precept. 
(e) The forecasted attrition data based on an estimated loss projection by 
grade, to meet a specified target determined two fiscal years out. 
The precept is released from the Secretary of the Navy and provides specific 
instruction to the promotion board. In particular, the precept provides guidance that the 
Secretary of the Navy deems important and appoints members to the selection board.  
Important information may include lists, such as critically short PMOSs, or it may 
contain a directive for board members.  Figure 2 is an example of a typical Marine Corps 
officer promotion board precept. 
 
65
Board Precept (Promotion and CSB)
Non-Traditional Billets
The War on Terrorism has seen the growth of billets
traditionally not filled by Marine Officers.  Officers
assigned to nation building and crisis operations billets
are critical to the success of our Country's policies.  The
board should be especially diligent in weighing the
qualifications of officers serving in Transition Teams
(TT) and Joint Individual Augment (IA) billets.  Service
in these critical billets should weigh equal to
traditional Marine Corps officer billets in the
operational forces supporting the Global War on
Terrorism during board deliberations.
 
Figure 2.   Example Marine Corps Officer Promotion Board Precept 
(Source: From HQMC MMOA FY-08 Road Show Brief 2007) 
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This message instructs board members to look beyond what billets they believe 
Marine officers should have worked in and instead look at what billets are important to 
the Marine Corps during the global war on terrorism and treat those billets with as much 
importance as traditional Marine Corps officer billets. 
Title 10 mandates that the Commandant of the Marine Corps provide written 
notification to eligible officers no less than 30 days prior to the convening of the 
promotion board.  The Marine Corps normally does this through the Manpower 
Personnel Management (MMPR) branch, which sends out a naval message 
(MARADMIN) with various information including: convening date of the board, name 
and date of rank of the senior and junior officer in the in-zone population, and the name 
and date of the junior officer in the below-zone.   Lastly, officers eligible for promotion 
have an opportunity to communicate with the board on matters affecting promotion; this 
is normally clarifying information or providing information that may be missing from an 
officer’s record.     
Once the board has adjourned, it is responsible for preparing a board report.  This 
report contains a list of all selectees, a statistical analysis, precept, a list of officers 
eligible for promotion, notice of convening, promotion plan, and sampling of records.5   
Title 10 mandates that no member of the board or recorder of a board are authorized to 
disclose the board’s proceedings, and that no board information is to be released unless 
authorized by either the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, or the President of 
the United States.6   Along with the board report, the president of the board must submit a 
letter that outlines the basis for the board’s findings. 
After the board report has been signed and the nomination package has been 
prepared,7 it is forwarded for endorsement by the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
(CMC), the Office of the Judge advocate General of the Navy, and the Secretary of the 
                                                 
5 Promotions Manual MCO P1400.31C. 
6 Promotions Manual MCO P1400.31C. 
7 Senate confirmation is required for all officers on active duty selected for promotion to the grades of 
major or above, the CMC (MMPR) prepares a nomination package for all boards requiring Presidential and 
Senate approval. (Promotion Manual MCO P1400.31C, 4006). 
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Navy.  According to the promotions manual, an advanced notification system was created 
by the CMC to “reduce the insensitiveness of notification through message traffic.”  The 
advanced notification system gives general officers and SESs the opportunity to 
personally notify officers not selected for promotion.  Lastly, once time has passed for 
personal notification, the CMC, after coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, will 
release a public message (ALNAV) containing the list of officers selected for promotion.  
D. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM 
The Marine Corps Performance Evaluation System (PES) is a tool to provide 
every Marine officer and the Marine Corps information regarding an individual’s 
performance, as well as periodic reporting and recording of that performance. The written 
evaluation, called the fitness report or “fitrep” is the principal method for evaluating a 
Marine’s performance.  According to Marine Corps Order 1610.7F, the Commandant’s 
guidance for the PES is: 
The completed fitness report is the most important information component 
in manpower management.  It is the primary means of evaluating a 
Marine’s performance.  The fitness report is the Commandant’s primary 
tool available for the selection of personnel for promotion, retention, 
augmentation, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments.  
Therefore, the completion of this report is one of an officer’s most critical 
responsibilities.  Inherent in this duty is the commitment of each reporting 
senior and reviewing officer to ensure the integrity of the system by close 
attention to accurate marking and timely reporting.  Every officer serves a 
role in the scrupulous maintenance of this evaluation system, ultimately 
important to both the individual and the Marine Corps.  Inflationary 
markings only serve to dilute the actual value of each report, rendering the 
fitness report ineffective.  Reviewing officials will not concur with 
inflated reports. 
The current PES, used since 1999, was implemented to correct problems with the 
old system, which was replete with unrealistic and inflated markings.  The Commandant, 
as stated above, has reiterated the importance of keeping the system free of inaccurate 
markings and the significance the fitness report plays throughout a Marine’s career.     
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The Marine Corps Performance Evaluation System provides detailed instructions 
regarding requirements for the submission of fitness reports.  The system has been 
designed to provide thorough and accurate reports while minimizing any situation in 
which a Marine has two reporting seniors (RS).  The PES also ensures Marines receive a 
relevant evaluation for every primary billet they hold, and that there are no lapses in 
evaluating a Marine at any time from the rank of sergeant through major general.  These 
Marines are required to receive fitness reports for any of the 13 occasions that occur:  
 




Change of Reporting Senior 
Transfer 
Change of Duty 
To Temporary Duty 
From Temporary Duty 
End of Service 
Change in Status 
Annual (Active Component) 
Annual (Reserve Component) 
Semiannual (lieutenants only) 
Reserve Training 
 
Along with following required reporting occasions, RSs can submit non-observed 
fitness reports if the reporting period is 89 days or less or the RS has insufficient observation 
time.  Reporting Seniors are required to observe the Marine they are reporting on for a 
minimum amount of time.  Reporting Seniors are required to submit reports if the reporting 
occasion period is longer than 90 days.  They must submit reports for periods 31 days or 
longer if the reporting occasion is either semiannual, temporary duty, or change in status.   
                                                 
8 When more than one occasion occurs simultaneously, use the occasion that appears highest on the 
list. (MCO 1610.7F, 2006, p. 3-4). 
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An RS is the first person in a Marine’s chain of command.  This is normally a 
commissioned officer, but the RS can also be a civilian, warrant officer, or, in rare 
circumstances, a staff noncommissioned officer. The RS plays an integral role in the 
effectiveness of the PES, the relevance of the fitness report, and the success of the Marine 
being reported on (MRO).  The PES states that, “The RS must establish and clearly 
convey duties and responsibilities to the MRO and observe, evaluate, and accurately 
report on the Marine’s performance, professional qualities, and potential.”  “Inherent in 
this duty is the commitment of the RS to preserve the integrity of the PES by having the 
moral courage to report with the utmost accuracy.” (MCO1610.7F, 2006, p. 2-3)   
Furthermore, the RS is responsible for forwarding fitness reports to the Reviewing 
Officer (RO) and counseling the MRO throughout the period covered.  
The Reviewing Officer (RO) is similar to the RS.  The RO is normally the first 
person in the RS’s chain of command, and he or she is responsible for tasking, 
supervising, and evaluating the RS.  Reviewing Officers are vital in that they provide 
experience and leadership to RSs.  They ensure the RS is adhering to Marine Corps 
policy regarding the PES and are fulfilling their requirements as an RS. 
Appendix A. contains a copy of the fitness report form.  Fitness reports have five 
pages with a total of 12 sections (A through L).  Section A provides descriptive 
information about the MRO that includes name, grade, date of rank, PMOS, height, 
weight, PFT, and rifle and pistol score.  Section A also includes information regarding 
the organization and unit, occasion of report and the period it covers, duty preference of 
the MRO, recommendation for promotion, and identifies the RS and RO. 
Section B, billet description, illustrates what the MRO was required to do in their 
billet during the reporting period.  This section is the foundation for the evaluation.  
Section C, billet accomplishments, highlights key accomplishments during the reporting 
period.  Normally this section is completed by the MRO via an “MRO worksheet” and 
reviewed by the RS prior to completing the report. 
Sections D through H evaluate 14 traits the Marine Corps believes, defines a 
Marine and records how well the Marine fulfills his duties and responsibilities.  These 
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traits are divided in to five sections: mission accomplishment, individual character, 
leadership, intellect and wisdom, and fulfillment of evaluation responsibilities.  Marines 
are evaluated on each trait.  The RS selects one of the markings (A through H) that best 
fit how the MRO performed, fulfilled, or embodied that trait during the reporting period.  
An “A” is the lowest marking and “G” is the highest.9   If an MRO receives an “A” 
marking in any category regardless of how the rest of the report is marked, the report is 
adverse.  Both “A” and “G” markings are rare and require substantial rationale and 
justification.    
The manner in which these blocks are marked creates a fitness report average.  
According to the PES manual, “each block in the marking gradient for each PARS has an 
assigned numeric value as follows: A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4, E=5, F=6, and G=7.  Block H 
does not factor into the calculation of the average.  The average of the observed attributes 
reflects the mean of the numeric value for all observed attributes on that report.” 
(MCO1610.7F, 2006, G-1)  The fitness report average allows the Marine Corps to 
calculate, among other things, the RS’s average of all fitness reports written on Marines 
of similar grade and the RS’s highest fitness report average of any report written on 
Marines of a similar grade.  The first reflects the, “mean of the numeric value for all 
fitness reports written by the RS on Marines of a similar grade.  The latter reflects the 
highest fitness report average of any report written by the RS on Marines of similar 
grade.” (MCO1610.7F, 2006, G-2)  These values enable the calculation of both relative 
values and cumulative relative values.  Relative values “reflect how the fitness report 
average of an individual report compares to the RS’s average of all fitness reports written 
by the RS on Marines of the same grade [and] the highest fitness report average of any 
report written by the RS on a Marine of the same grade as the MRO.” (MCO1610.7F, 
2006, G-2) The cumulative relative value reflects the cumulative relative value of the 
MRO’s fitness report based on the RS’s rating history for Marines of the same grade as 
the MRO.  This number is variable and will change as the RS writes additional reports on 
Marines of the same grade as the (MRO. MCO1610.7F, 2006, G-2)  
                                                 
9 Reporting Seniors should mark block “H” for those instances when the period of observation 
precludes an accurate assessment. (MCO 1610.7F, 2006, p. 4-24). 
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Section I gives an RS the opportunity, not provided elsewhere in the report, to 
articulate important information about the MRO.  This section is where the RS enters 
mandatory, directed, and additional comments.  The PES manual describes these 
comments as followed: 
Mandatory comments are those required to give the CMC a more 
complete picture of the MRO’s professional character. 
Directed comments as required by this manual, provide the CMC 
amplifying information concerning the MRO. 
Additional comments may span a wide variety of events, 
accomplishments, or activities that the RS deems important to convey to 
the CMC. 
Ultimately, section I exists to allow the RS to make a more detailed account of a 
Marine’s professional character, conduct, and performance while in the performance of 
his or her assigned duty as well as outside of these duties.  Comments in this section 
should be objective, concise, and free from superlative language. 
Section J is the signature and date section.  Reporting Seniors are required to sign 
and date the report while MROs are only required to sign the report if it is adverse.  
Section K allows the RO to indicate if he or she believes they have had sufficient 
observation time and provides them an opportunity to concur or not with the RSs 
evaluation of the Marine.  If the RO believes they have had enough observation time they 
are required to grade the MRO on a scale, called the Christmas Tree, from unsatisfactory 
to eminently qualified, (there are six other choices between these two markings).  The RO 
is also required to provide written comments in this section.  These comments should 
amplify the “Christmas Tree” marking, evaluate potential for promotion, command, 
assignment, resident professional military education, retention, and put RSs evaluation in 
perspective.  The last section, Section L, is only completed if there is an addendum to the 
fitness report.  Addendums are not normally used unless there is a narrative for an 
adverse report, when a high marking needs to be justified, section I comments exceed 
space provided, the MRO offers a rebuttal statement to an adverse report, or the MRO 
has been recommended for accelerated promotion. 
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E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A Marine Officer’s career is impacted by his or her performance at TBS, while 
other factors affecting promotion grow increasingly influential as Marines progress in 
their careers.  The lineal number they receive upon finishing TBS will play a large role in 
when an officer is promoted in relation to their peers.    
The Marine Corps performance evaluation system is the best indicator of how an 
officer performed in the various aspects of his or her job over a specified period of time.  
The fitness report is used to track an officer’s performance through various jobs, ranks, 
and periods of time while accounting for the different supervisors an officer will have 
throughout his or her career.  The PES is the main tool the Marine Corps uses to formally 
evaluate Marine officers.  
Unlike in other services the promotion system in the Marine Corps does not 
promote officers based on their MOS or occupation field.  Instead, the Marine Corps 
promotes its officers based on who is the best or most fully qualified. The Marine Corps 
tries to select officers to the next grade whom they believe have the potential to perform 
sufficiently in the next grade.  The PES was designed to aide in the selection process by 









III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous prior studies have focused on military officer performance. Most of 
these studies examined the effect of background factors on various officers’ performance, 
such as accession program, aptitude scores, and demographic characteristics.  This 
chapter will review several of the studies that focus on performance of USMC officers at 
TBS and the relationship between MOS assignment and success in the operating forces. 
To conduct this review we chose four studies that most closely correlated with the 
purpose of our research.  These studies are relevant to our research because they have 
examined variables impacting performance at TBS and factors impacting Marine Corps 
officer success in the operating forces as measured by promotion, retention, or fitness 
report scores.  Our thesis examines the effect of Marine Corps officer performance at 
TBS, accession source, and MOS assignment on performance in the operating forces, as 
measured by the relative value of officer fitness reports.      
Ergun (2003) studied the factors affecting career development of U.S. Marine 
Corps officers.  Specifically, he sought to analyze how different officer accession 
programs affected the careers of Marine officers. For his analysis, Ergun used three 
different data sets.  The first was the Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession 
Career (MCCOAC) data file.  This file was prepared by the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA) and contained 28,058 observations from officer entry cohorts for fiscal year 1980 
through fiscal year 1999.  It also included two fitness report files.  One contained 
officer’s fitness reports that were written under the old PES system, which was in effect 
until 1998.  This file consisted of more than 48,000 officers in grades O-1 through O-8. 
The second file contained fitness reports written between 1998, when the new fitness 
report system was implemented, and 2001. This file included 52,366 fitness reports on 
officers in the grades of O-1 through O-6. 
Ergun used TBS class standing percentile, retention to ten years of commissioned 
service, and promotion to O-4 and O-5 ranks as indicators of performance.  He also 
created a performance index (PI) based on fitness report marks.  He took traits for a given 
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report and converted them into numerical values to create the PI. He created separate PIs 









Figure 3.   Steps in calculating Performance Index in Ergun (2003) 
 
Ergun used these performance indicators as dependent variables in various 
models.  He used a variety of methods to estimate these models, including OLS, probit, 
bivariate probit, and non-linear logit equations.  Table 2 shows the effects of 
commissioning sources and being prior enlisted on performance indicators.  Column 1 
indicates their effect on overall TBS class rank.  Columns 2, 4, and 6 contain old and new 
fitness report results; the first lines are old report estimates.  Column 3 contains their 
effect on retention to 10-years of service as an officer, and columns 5 and 7 show their 





Convert Grades to Numbers: 
-Old Fitreps 
(Unsatisfactory,…Outstanding)Æ(1 to 6) 
-New Fitreps 
(A through G)Æ(1 to 7) 
Calculate the average 
score for each fitrep 
Calculate the average score of all 
fitreps received at each grade 
(O-1, O-2, O-3,O-4) 
Convert the scores for 
each rank to a 100-point 
scale
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MCP 13.7*** N.S. 
5.72*** 
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 







*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.01 
level Perc. Points=Percentage Points; N.S=Not significant; N.A.=Not Applicable 
 
The results of Ergun’s study suggest that the performance of USNA graduates and 
NROTC graduates is fairly similar.  NROTC graduates rank slightly higher at TBS and 
are more likely to be promoted to O-4 and O-5.  On the other hand, their PI scores during 
grades O-2 through O-4 are lower than those of Naval Academy graduates and retention 
to the 10-year point is the same for both.  Compared to USNA graduates, PLC graduates 
have a lower class rank at TBS, a lower PI at each rank, and lower retention to 10 years 
of commissioned service; however, for those who stay, PLC graduates are more likely to 
be promoted to O-4 and O-5.  OCC graduates performed lower in every category, except 
promotion to O-4 where they had a 14-percentage points higher promotion rate, when 
compared to USNA graduates.  MECEP students outperformed Naval Academy 
graduates at every level except for older cohorts under the O-3 PI based on the old fitness 
report.  MECEP students also outperformed USNA graduates under the O-4 promotion 
and the O-4 PI based on the old or new fitness report, which were not statistically 
                                                 
10 Ergun 119. 
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significant.  Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) graduates performed better at TBS 
than USNA graduates, were more likely to stay to 10 years, but they had lower PI scores 
across every grade.  Despite this, they were more likely to be promoted to O-4 and O-5.  
There were insufficient observations to analyze the performance of Meritorious 
Commissioning Program (MCP) graduates except for TBS class rank and the O-2 PI, 
where they performed better than USNA graduates.  
Based on his findings Ergun recommended that the Marine Corps conduct further 
research on enlisted commissioning programs, prior enlisted officers, and the O-5 
promotion process.  He also suggested further research on identifying factors correlated 
with OCC and PLC graduates’ higher rates of promotion to major.  Lastly he 
recommends examining USNA graduates’ and minorities’ poorer performance at TBS.     
Finley (2002) “compare[d] the performance of Naval Academy graduates at TBS 
as a function of the different Marine-specific summer training programs that were 
required of Naval Academy graduates over time.” His main focus was to determine 
whether participation in OCS/Bulldog, which was required for Naval Academy Classes 
from 1989 to 1992, significantly impacted performance at TBS.    
His analysis relied on data on Naval Academy graduates from class years 1988 to 
1999.  Finley merged data from the Naval Academy’s Office of Institutional Research, 
Planning and Assessment, which contained information on graduating classes of 1988 to 
2000, with data from the Manpower section at Headquarters Marine Corps.  This data 
covered each officer’s performance at TBS from 1980 through 1999. The merged data 
file contained 1,615 records after dropping USNA midshipmen who were not Marine 
service selectees as well as other individuals for reasons varying from incomplete records 
to failing to graduate from the Naval Academy.  
Finley used ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the effect of Marine-specific 
summer training on the TBS class rank.  His TBS performance model also included basic 
midshipmen demographics, ground or aviation option, Naval Academy varsity athlete 
status, order of merit, prior enlisted experience, major area of study, parents’ military 
experience, service selection participation, and service assignment/capstone course 
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participation.  Finley found that participation in Marine-specific training, namely 
participation in Bulldog, increased performance of Naval Academy students at TBS, 
holding all else constant.11 He also found that order of percentile merit, cumulative 
military QPR, and OCS/Bulldog participation were the top predictors of performance at 
TBS.12   
Finley recommends that the Naval Academy reevaluate its summer training 
programs and expand Marine-specific summer training programs.  Finley suggests 
creating a Marine-specific training pipeline after third-class summer so Academy 
midshipmen interested in becoming Marine officers could acquire and hone the requisite 
skill set necessary for success at TBS.       
Perry (2006) explored the relationship between PMOS and survival/promotion for 
mid- grade officers in the Marine Corps.  Perry evaluated whether PMOS influenced 
promotion when an officer was in-zone for O-4 and O-5, and whether PMOS influenced 
retention rates for officers with less than ten years of commissioned service.   
Perry’s promotion analysis was based on data from the MCCOAC, which covered 
fiscal years 1980 to 1999, and a Marine Officer Cohort data file from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC), which contains cohort data for fiscal years 1980 
through 2001.   He then analyzed cohorts from FY 1980 through 1993 in promotion and 
retention models to examine the effects of PMOS on selection and survival of majors at 
roughly 10 years of service.  He used FY 1980 through 1988 cohorts to analyze the 
promotion and retention of lieutenant colonels at approximately 15 years of service.  
Perry’s statistical analysis used logistic regression to analyze promotion outcomes and 
Cox proportional hazard models to analyze survival over time.   
                                                 
11 Comparison of means showed that those participating in the OCS/Bulldog training program had a 
2.54 percentile point advantage in class standing at The Basic School compared to those completing 
Leatherneck Training and a 6.35 percentile point advantage compared to the No-Training cohort.  The 
primary prediction model found a 9.23 percentile point higher difference in TBS class standing for those 
who participated in OCS/Bulldog compared to those who participated in Leatherneck while the secondary 
model found a 16.34 percentile point difference. (Finley 91). 
12 Percentile order of merit is an individual’s standing at graduation from the Naval Academy. 
Cumulative Military Performance QPR is an important component of a midshipman’s order of merit. 
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The results of Perry’s study indicate several points regarding promotion and 
retention.  He found that 94 percent of the 32 PMOSs were significant predictors of the 
probability of an officer staying until 10 years of commissioned service, when compared 
to an infantry officer.  All pilot PMOSs, except EA6B and C130, were positively 
correlated with the probability of staying. All of the remaining PMOSs were negatively 
correlated with staying until 10 years of commissioned service, when compared to an 
infantry officer.  Perry also found that of all the PMOSs 32 percent were significant 
predictors of whether an officer was promoted to O-4.13  Specifically, the PMOS 0402, 
logistics officer, was positively correlated with promotion (when compared to infantry) 
while the majority of pilot PMOSs were negatively correlated.  The remaining 22 PMOSs 
were not significantly different from infantry in their promotion rates to O-4.  For 
promotion to O-5, Perry found that 19 percent of PMOSs were significant predictors of 
whether an officer is promoted.14  Air defense controllers and FA18 PMOSs were 
positively correlated with promotion to O-5 (compared to infantry officers), while 
Intelligence, Engineers, Public Affairs, and CH53-D were negatively correlated with O-5 
promotion. 
Based on his findings, Perry recommended that the Marine Corps offer career 
bonuses to officers in critically undermanned PMOSs, increase accessions in these 
PMOSs, lower accessions in PMOSs which are never short handed, and increase the 
minimum obligation time for critically undermanned PMOSs.  Perry also made 
recommendations regarding promotion board procedures.  He suggests having the 
president of the board group officers by PMOS and have different individuals brief each 
PMOS.  He argues that if this were done, the briefer could recommend to the board the 
most qualified officer within these critically short PMOSs and allow board members to 
compare the qualified officers in undermanned PMOSs to qualified officers in other 
PMOSs.        
                                                 
13 Officers with a critically short PMOS have on average a three percent higher promotion rate to O-4 
than officers in the remaining PMOSs. (Perry p. 130). 
14 Officers with a critically short PMOS have a three percent lower promotion rate to O-5 than officers 
in the remaining PMOSs. (Perry p. 130). 
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North and Smith (1993) examined completion of Officer Candidate School 
(OCS), survival to commissioning, and class rank at TBS.   Prior to the study they 
observed that the majority of officer candidates do not become commissioned officers 
because they do not complete OCS or they do not accept a commission.  “OCS attrition 
has been especially high among female and minority candidates…The differential 
continues at the next phase of officer training, TBS.  Although about 95 percent of the 
students graduate from TBS, the average class rank of minorities and women is lower 
than that of white males.  (North and Smith, p. 1)  They stated three objectives in 
conducting this study; estimate whether the gap in performance is a result of 
discrimination towards minorities, identify the potential officer candidates with the best    
chances of being commissioned and having a successful career, and identify efficiencies 
in the mix of OCS programs.   
They used data from the Automated Recruit Management System ARMS.15   Data 
was available on Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) and Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 
graduates, as well as USNA and NROTC accessions.  They also gathered data from TBS 
that covered FY 1988 through FY 1991 and data from the Headquarters Master File 
(HMF) which tracks changes in status and contains information on Marines from his or 
hers ARMS file.16   The longitudinal file on Marine Corps personnel was merged with 
TBS information and yielded 15,970 records for their analysis. 
North and Smith used a logit model to estimate the probability of OCS attrition as 
a function of whether a candidate failed or passed OCS.  The study found that a 
performance gap exists in whites and blacks even when they adjusted for such factors as 
physical fitness and aptitude.  More specifically, the most important factor in determining 
the completion of OCS and commissioning for men was prior Marine experience.17  The 
                                                 
15 ARMS contains data on all applicants to the Marine Corps both officer and enlisted. A candidate’s 
record begins when the recruiting station inputs basic application information.  
16 CNA receives quarterly extracts of the HMF and has used them to build a longitudinal file for all 
active-duty Marine Corps personnel. 
17 Other effects were associated with physical fitness test (PFT) scores and race/ethnicity; all 
minorities were 8 percentage points less likely than whites to complete OCS. (North and Smith 1993).   
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greatest determinant of class rank at TBS was race.18   However, they did not believe that 
there was any “overt discrimination” but that part or all of the gap in completion rates 
likely resulted from other factors that were not measurable.   
The authors recommended several actions the Marine Corps could take to 
decrease the performance gap.  First, they recommended expanding enlisted-to-officer 
commissioning programs.  Secondly, they suggested lowering aptitude standards, which 
may seem counterintuitive.  However, due to the large number of African American 
candidates that require aptitude waivers, 44 percent compared to 14 percent of whites, a 
perception has been created that all African American Marine Corps officer have entered 
the officer pipeline with a waiver and thus “have been given an unfair advantage and are 
not fully qualified…by lowering the standard, the Corps can still pick the best without 
imposing the waiver burden on all.” (North and Smith, p. 4).  Lowering the aptitude 
standards would also lower the need for aptitude waivers and theoretically eliminate the 
perception that black officers have earned their commission because of a waiver and not 
because they are fully qualified.  Next, they recommended recruiting more OCC 
candidates as opposed to PLC candidates, as well as students that attend very competitive 
schools and schools with NROTC units. They also recommended implementing a 
mentoring program between Officer Selection Officer (OSO) and candidate in which 
OSO’s can prepare candidates both physically and emotionally for OCS and TBS.  
Lastly, they recommended recording and retaining more information on candidates and 
officers so that a thorough analysis can be conducted on how accession characteristics 
correlate with later success.          
This thesis compares performance at TBS, specifically leadership, academic, and 
military skills performance, to performance in the operating forces.  In reviewing 
previous literature, we found that various performance measures were used to determine 
the success of an officer or the effectiveness of a particular commissioning program.  
Promotion and retention are the most widely used measures of success; however, fitness 
report scores have been used as well.  Studies have also addressed the question of 
                                                 
18 African-Americans had a class rank percentile 22 points below that of whites.  
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whether performance as a TBS student is correlated with various measures of success 
such as promotion and retention. Ergun’s thesis compared the impact of the various 
accession programs on performance at TBS and performance throughout an officer’s 
career.  Finley studied Naval Academy graduates’ performance at TBS as a function of 
the various Marine-specific training programs available to Naval Academy midshipman 
at various times.  Perry examined PMOS assignment and survival for mid grade Marine 
Corps officers. Lastly, can studies have focused on the effects of demographic variables, 
specifically race and gender, and their effect on performance at TBS and OCS. 
While some of the results of these studies differ, several consistent findings 
emerge regardless of the data, methodology, or models used.  Performance at TBS and 
prior enlisted experience are found to be significant predictors of promotion and 
retention.  Furthermore, prior enlisted experience and race are significant predictors of 
performance at OCS and TBS.  What is not consistent, is the impact and significance of 
gender and specific accession programs on performance at TBS, promotion, and 
retention.  Ergun’s study indicates that the performance of women at TBS is significantly 
lower, while promotion rates and retention rates are higher than their male counterparts.  
Perry’s study indicates that women’s performance, promotion, and retention relative to 
men varies widely depending on other factors such as rank, accession program, and 
marital status.  The impact and significance of accession programs depends on whether 
performance, promotion, or retention is being measured.  Ergun’s study found that ECP 
and NROTC programs increase the likelihood of promotion relative to USNA; however, 
the findings on their impact on retention are mixed. In regard to performance at TBS his 
study suggests almost every accession program, except PLC and OCC, are positively 
correlated with performance at TBS relative to USNA. The CNA study indicates that 
USNA graduates have higher TBS class ranks compared to NROTC graduates, whereas 
PLC and OCC have lower TBS class rank. 
While there are conflicting findings in the literature regarding the effect of various 
background factors on measures of performance, there is concurrence that prior exposure 
to the military will have a positive and significant impact on measures of performance for 
Marine Corps officers in the training pipeline and operating forces.  These findings, along 
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with data from fitness reports completed after 1999 when changes to the PES went into 
effect, provide an opportunity to focus on a specific area of performance, leadership at 
TBS, and its relationship with performance of junior officers in the Marine Corps 
operating forces. 
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IV. DATA SOURCES, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Total Force Data Warehouse Dataset 
A dataset was created from the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW) that included primarily demographic data for all officers who were newly 
commissioned between 1999 and 2005 inclusive.  Also included in the TFDW dataset 
was basic service data, such as Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date and Pay Entry Base 
Date.  TFDW data is gathered in snapshots that are taken from the Marine Corps’ 
electronic administrative systems. 
2. Center for Naval Analysis TBS Dataset 
The Center for Naval Analysis warehouses TBS performance data, to include 
overall class ranking and final percentage, rankings and percentages for each of the three 
areas of evaluation (Academics, Military Skills, Leadership), TBS class size, and top 
three MOS preferences.  This dataset also included numerous demographic variables and 
a large number of performance variables.  The demographic variables included marital 
status, race, gender, ethnicity, and commissioning source.  Performance variables 
contained in this dataset include rifle, pistol, and PFT scores recorded at various stages in 
the officer’s career.  The CNA dataset contained most of the explanatory variables used 
in our models.  TBS performance data was obtained from all TBS classes at the 
beginning of Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 to the end of FY 2005. 
3. Manpower Management Support Branch (MMSB) FITREP Dataset 
Fitness report data was obtained from MMSB.  All variables in this dataset were 
compiled from values that can be found on the Master Brief Sheet as discussed in 
Chapter II.  Variables included were Relative Value at processing, Cumulative Relative 
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Value, FITREP Score, Reporting Senior Average at Processing, Reporting Senior 
Cumulative Average, Grade of Marine Reported On, Fitness Report dates covered, and 
Reviewing Officer assessment.  Appendix B. contains a sample Master Brief Sheet.  This 
data was essentially time series data, in which each officer had his series of Fitness 
Reports captured sequentially from the officer’s first FITREP, up to the last FITREP the 
officer received by the end of FY 2005.  The dataset includes officers who have separated 
from the Marine Corps prior to the end of FY 2005, thus their FITREPS are included 
until they separated.  The dataset also includes FITREP data of officers who were not yet 
promoted to the next rank.  Officer performance as indicated by FITREP scores was used 
as the dependent variable in our models. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Descriptive statistics for each variable used in this analysis are presented in Table 
3.  These descriptive statistics are from the entire dataset, which includes all contract 
aviators.  Because of the uniqueness of contract aviators, we also analyze a restricted 
sample that only includes ground assignable officers.  Descriptive statistics for ground 













Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for All Officers 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Cumulative Relative Value 6141 .1794124 4.101934 -10 10 
Cumulative Relative Value, O1 4637 .2926733 5.281623 -10 10 
Cumulative Relative Value, O2 5472 .366346 4.600574 -10 10 
Cumulative Relative Value, O3 2180 -
.3507814 
5.123115 -10 10 
Overall Class Rank % 6141 49.78489 28.83709 0 99.61539
Academic Class Rank % 4814 49.33091 28.85179 0 99.61539
Leadership Class Rank % 4814 50.86372 28.73626 0 100 
Military Skills Class Rank % 4814 49.35114 28.7514 0 100 
In Top Third of TBS Class 6141 .3274711 .4693289 0 1 
In Middle Third of TBS Class 6141 .3290995 .4699244 0 1 
In Bottom Third of TBS Class 6141 .3434294 .474892 0 1 
Received 1st MOS Preference 6141 .4494382 .4974774 0 1 
Received a top 3 MOS 
preference 
6141 .6065787 .4885487 0 1 
Did not receive a Top 3 MOS 6141 .3934213 .4885487 0 1 
Female officer 6141 .0884221 .2839309 0 1 
Male officer 6141 .9115779 .2839309 0 1 
PLC commission 6141 .2610324 .4392333 0 1 
OCC commission 6141 .3002768 .4584156 0 1 
NROTC commission 6141 .14851 .3556338 0 1 
MECEP commission 6141 .1022635 .3030192 0 1 
ECP commission 6141 .0420127 .2006345 0 1 
USNA commission 6141 .1104055 .31342 0 1 
MCP commission 6141 .0201922 .1406686 0 1 
Prior enlisted Marine 6141 .1644683 .3707302 0 1 
Age at commissioning 5976 24.75686 2.837464 19.75 35 
TBS class FY98 6141 .0019541 .0441654 0 1 
TBS class FY99 6141 .197362 .3980402 0 1 
TBS class FY00 6141 .2160886 .4116089 0 1 
TBS class FY01 6141 .2025729 .4019495 0 1 
TBS class FY02 6141 .1690278 .374807 0 1 
TBS class FY03 6141 .1411822 .3482378 0 1 
TBS class FY04 6141 .0649731 .2464985 0 1 
TBS class FY05 6141 .0068393 .0824233 0 1 
White officer 6141 .8324377 .3735075 0 1 
Black officer 6141 .0617163 .2406592 0 1 
Race other than black or 
white 
6141 .0299625 .1704979 0 1 
Single officer 6141 .7288715 .4445785 0 1 
Married officer 6141 .2507735 .4334937 0 1 
Divorced officer 6141 .0198665 .1395527 0 1 
Widowed officer 6141 .0001628 .0127609 0 1 
Separated officer 6141 .0001628 .0127609 0 1 
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Table 4.   Descriptive Statistics for Ground Assignable Officers 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Cumulative Relative Value 5058 0.3046227 4.132904 -10 10 
Cumulative Relative Value, O1 4347 0.3284367 5.281314 -10 10 
Cumulative Relative Value, O2 4554 0.4409112 4.588262 -10 10 
Cumulative Relative Value, O3 1616 0.058929 5.420991 -10 10 
Overall Class Rank % 5058 48.45062 29.24644 0 99.61539
Academic Class Rank % 4007 48.34665 29.14428 0 99.61539
Leadership Class Rank % 4007 50.60166 29.17268 0 99.61539
Military Skills Class Rank % 4007 47.40728 29.03143 0 100 
In Top Third of TBS Class 5058 0.3155397 0.4647764 0 1 
In Middle Third of TBS Class 5058 0.3169237 0.4653234 0 1 
In Bottom Third of TBS Class 5058 0.3675366 0.4821819 0 1 
Received 1st MOS Preference 5058 0.3325425 0.4711708 0 1 
Received a Top 3 MOS Preference 5058 0.5233294 0.4995048 0 1 
Did not receive a Top 3 MOS 5058 0.4766706 0.4995048 0 1 
Female officer 5058 0.0988533 0.2984945 0 1 
Male officer 5058 0.9011467 0.2984945 0 1 
PLC Commission 5058 0.2522736 0.4343604 0 1 
OCC Commission 5058 0.2953737 0.4562557 0 1 
NROTC Commission 5058 0.1528272 0.3598564 0 1 
MECEP Commission 5058 0.1081455 0.3105948 0 1 
ECP Commission 5058 0.0484381 0.2147114 0 1 
USNA Commission 5058 0.1039937 0.3052825 0 1 
MCP Commission 5058 0.0231317 0.1503365 0 1 
Prior Enlisted Marine 5058 0.1797153 0.3839881 0 1 
Age at Commissioning 4929 24.85159 2.909381 19.75 35 
TBS Class FY 98 5058 0.0021748 0.0465883 0 1 
TBS Class FY 99 5058 0.1868327 0.3898157 0 1 
TBS Class FY 00 5058 0.2077896 0.4057655 0 1 
TBS Class FY 01 5058 0.198102 0.3986089 0 1 
TBS Class FY 02 5058 0.1686437 0.374474 0 1 
TBS Class FY 03 5058 0.1553974 0.3623189 0 1 
TBS Class FY 04 5058 0.0757216 0.2645784 0 1 
TBS Class FY 05 5058 0.0053381 0.0728741 0 1 
White Officer 5058 0.8169237 0.3867673 0 1 
Black Officer 5058 0.0689996 0.2534785 0 1 
Race other than black or white 5058 0.0336101 0.1802412 0 1 
Single officer 5058 0.7168841 0.4505568 0 1 
Married officer 5058 0.2611704 0.439316 0 1 
Divorced officer 5058 0.0213523 0.1445701 0 1 
Widowed officer 5058 0.0001977 0.0140608 0 1 
Separated officer 5058 0.0001977 0.0140608 0 1 
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Note that the academic and military skills rankings of the ground assignable 
officers are lower than the academic and military skills ranking percentages for the data 
that includes the contract aviators, whereas the leadership ranking percentage is nearly 
the same in the two samples.  Ground assignable officers also have lower top and middle 
third percentages and higher bottom third percentages in these tables.  The percentage of 
females is greater by 1% in the ground assignable group.  Prior enlisted Marines are also 
more heavily represented in the ground assignable group. 
The marital status variables all denote the marital status of the officer at the time 
of commissioning.  Also of note is that there are 466 observations that contained no race 
code information.  Therefore the means of the binary variables for race (which represent 
percentages) do not add to 100% as we would expect.  Last, the TBS FY variables denote 
in which FY the officer attended TBS. 
1. Cumulative Relative Values 
Average cumulative relative values were calculated from the raw FITREP data 
provided by MMSB.  An example of the raw FITREP data is shown in Table 5, below: 
Table 5.   Examples of FITREP Data for Two Officers 
ID Grade From Date To Date Rel Val at Proc Cum Rel Val 
A 2NDLT 10-Apr-02 11-Oct-02 NA NA 
A 2NDLT 12-Oct-02 10-Apr-03 NA NA 
A 2NDLT 11-Apr-03 31-Jul-03 NA 89.66 
A 2NDLT 1-Aug-03 31-Jan-04 NA 92.98 
A 2NDLT 1-Feb-04 29-Mar-04 89.78 89.78 
A 1STLT 7-Apr-04 31-Oct-04 80 81.32 
A 1STLT 1-Nov-04 12-May-05 90.72 89.99 
A 1STLT 13-May-05 28-Jun-05 NA NA 
A 1STLT 29-Jun-05 31-Oct-05 92.86 92.5 
           
B 2NDLT 17-Jul-00 19-Jan-01 NA NA 
B 2NDLT 20-Jan-01 12-Apr-01 89.53 87.61 
B 1STLT 12-Apr-01 21-Jun-02 NA NA 
B 1STLT 22-Jun-02 30-Nov-02 NA NA 
B 1STLT 4-Dec-02 24-Jan-03 NA NA 
B 1STLT 24-Jan-03 31-May-03 100 100 
B 1STLT 1-Jun-03 30-Nov-03 100 100 
B 1STLT 27-Nov-03 30-Apr-04 NA 90.86 
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B 1STLT 1-May-04 5-Jul-04 NA NA 
B 1STLT 6-Jul-04 2-Oct-04 100 97.26 
B 1STLT 4-Oct-04 1-Jan-05 93.69 93.26 
B CAPT 1-Jan-05 6-Apr-05 84.73 83.82 
B CAPT 7-Apr-05 25-May-05 NA NA 
  
Officer A was commissioned in March of 2002, and his first two fitness reports 
were “Not Observed” reports.  These first reports were most likely from TBS and the 
officer’s MOS producing school.  Officer A then received 3 observed fitness reports as a 
second lieutenant.  He was then promoted to the rank of first lieutenant in April of 2004.  
As a first lieutenant, he received 2 observed fitness reports, one not observed fitness 
report (for a period of less than 89 days, insufficient observation time), and then another 
observed fitness report.  Officer A was not followed long enough in the data to have been 
promoted to Captain. 
Officer B was commissioned in March of 1999.  He did not receive his first 
fitness report under the new PES until January of 2001, which was a “Not Observed” 
report.  Officer B’s next report was an observed report from January 2001 to April 2001.  
Officer B then received a series of “Not Observed” reports from April of 2001 until 
January of 2003.  This long gap in observed time is because officer B is an aviator.  The 
time spent in flight training is covered by “Not Observed” fitness reports.  Officer B then 
received 3 observed reports, one not observed report, 3 more observed reports, and 
another not observed report.  Officer B was followed in the data long enough to have 
been promoted to captain, and to have received 2 fitness reports at that rank. 
Average cumulative relative values capture the officer’s performance in the 
Operating Forces by measuring that officer’s performance relative to the reporting 
senior’s average.  As discussed in Chapter II, the Reporting Senior’s average is always 
90; therefore a cumulative relative value for a fitness report that exceeds 90 is an “above 
average” report.  Conversely, a report that has a cumulative relative value below 90 is a 
“below average” report.  
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In the raw FITREP data, each FITREP received from the beginning of FY99 to 
the end of FY05 for each officer in the dataset is a unique observation.  In order to 
calculate average cumulative relative values, this data was first collapsed by unique 
identifier and rank, which gave the average cumulative relative values for each officer at 
each rank.  For example, the first officer in the table (officer A) would have an average 
cumulative relative value for all FITREPs received as a second lieutenant and another 
average cumulative relative value for all FITREPS received as a first lieutenant.  Because 
the second officer in the table entered the Marine Corps so much earlier than the first, he 
would have average cumulative relative values received as a second lieutenant, first 
lieutenant, and captain. 
The raw FITREP data was then collapsed only by unique identifier to produce a 
single average cumulative relative value for each officer.  In the end, we obtain four 
cumulative relative value variables.  We subtract 90 from all these variables so that the 
resulting performance measures represent how far above or below average these 
cumulative relative values are.  As noted in the descriptive statistics tables, Table 3 and 
Table 4 none of the means of the average relative cumulative value variables is 0.  This is 
because the reporting senior profile is calculated so that every report that is written by the 
reporting senior is included in the calculation of that reporting senior’s average.  For 
example, suppose a reporting senior writes several reports on second lieutenants who are 
not in our dataset.  Then that same reporting senior writes several reports on second 
lieutenants who are in our dataset.  All these reports are used in the calculation of the 
reporting senior’s average.  But it is unlikely that the officers in our dataset will have 
average cumulative relative values that are zero because the reporting senior’s average is 
not calculated per officer, but rather by all officers of the same rank on whom the 
reporting senior has written reports.  The maximum and minimum values for the 
cumulative relative values are then by definition 10 and -10, as each reporting senior’s 
profile dictates that the worst report written by that reporting senior has a value of 80 and 
the best report has a value of 100.  The FITREPS in the data that have “NA” for the 
cumulative relative value are “Not Observed” reports.  These reports are ignored in the 
calculation of average cumulative relative values. 
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There are 6,141 observations for the cumulative relative value variable, which 
represent the 6,141 officers who were commissioned, graduated from TBS, and have 
FITREP scores from observed fitness reports during the years 1999 to 2005. 
For the ‘by grade’ average cumulative relative value variables in Table 3, we see 
that the most observations come when the officers are at the rank of first lieutenant 
(N=5,472).  This is logical, as many officers do not receive many observed fitness reports 
during their time as second lieutenants.  This is due to the amount of time it takes a newly 
commissioned second lieutenant to reach the operating forces.  Second lieutenants remain 
at that rank for 2 years from the date of commission.  Considering that TBS is 6 months, 
MOS schools can range in length anywhere from approximately 4 weeks to 6 months or 
more for ground assignable officers to 2-3 years for aviators, it is easy to see that there is 
less opportunity for second lieutenants to be evaluated. 
In this dataset, many of the officers are not followed in the data long enough to be 
promoted to the rank of captain and subsequently receive an observed fitness report for 
that grade.  Assuming that the officers in the dataset would all be promoted to captain at 
exactly 4 years from their commissioning date (an unrealistic assumption) only the 
officers who were commissioned between 1999 and 2001 would be followed in the data 
long enough to have been promoted to captain.  Therefore, there are relatively few 
officers in the data who have observed fitness reports at the rank of captain.  Likewise, as 
this FITREP data is longitudinal in nature, we can expect that, in most cases, officers who 
are commissioned earlier in the period covered by the data will have more reports than 
those who are commissioned later in the period covered.  This will not always be the 
case, however, as there are numerous factors that determine how many observed reports 
an officer receives over a given period of time.  For example, while officers are attending 
formal schools, they do not receive observed fitness reports so officers who attend longer 
formal schools will likely have fewer observed reports.  Also, an officer who has a 
succession of reporting seniors that transfer into and out of their jobs may receive a 
greater number of observed reports, provided the reporting seniors stay on the job long 
enough so that the fitness report must be an observed report.  We can control for the  
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length of time cohorts are observed in the data, and the corresponding difference in the 
number of fitness reports received, by including cohort dummies in our performance 
models. 
Ultimately, each officer in our dataset completed TBS and had his performance 
evaluated by at least one observed fitness report.  As the aim of this study is to determine 
the relationship between TBS performance and performance as a junior officer, we did 
not feel it was necessary to account for those officers who separated from the Marine 
Corps prior to 2005, either voluntarily or involuntarily and those who do separate from 
the Marine Corps are not removed from our samples. 
As shown in Table 3, the mean value of the cumulative relative value variable in 
the unrestricted sample is 0.179, and as shown in Table 4 the mean for the cumulative 
relative value for the restricted sample is 0.305.  This tells us that the ground assignable 
officers in our dataset have higher average fitness report scores than the contract aviators.  
One possible explanation for this may be that ground assignable officers have more 
opportunity to improve through doing than do aviators.  Ground assignable officers 
normally assume their duties within a short time of graduating from their primary MOS 
school, and immediately begin to build their experience.  Aviators spend years in training 
before they are evaluated in an operational unit. 
2. TBS Performance Variables 
All four TBS performance variables are continuous variables, having values 
ranging from zero to 100.  TBS performance data from CNA included final percentages 
and numerical class standings for the three areas of evaluation (Academics, Military 
Skills, and Leadership) and the final overall percentage and class standing.  Because class 
sizes differ, we normalized these standings for class sizes using the following formula: 




In this formula, rank was either the officer’s final overall TBS rank, or the final 
Academics, Leadership, or Military Skills rank.  In essence, this formula reversed the 
class rank so that larger values (rather than smaller ones) indicated better performance at 
TBS. 
As shown in Table 3, there are 6,141 observations for the overall class ranking 
percentage, yet there are only 4,814 observations for the leadership, military skills, and 
academics rankings.  The CNA dataset is missing all TBS performance data except final 
GPA and final rank for all observations for FY 2000.  This accounts for the difference in 
the number of observations between the overall class ranking percentage and those of 
leadership, academics, and military skills. 
The mean values for the TBS performance variables in the unrestricted sample are 
49.33 for academic ranking, 50.86 for leadership ranking, 49.35 for military skills 
ranking, and 49.78 for the overall TBS class ranking.  The mean values in the restricted 
sample are 48.35 for academic ranking, 50.60 for the leadership ranking, 47.41 for the 
military skills ranking, and 48.45 for the overall TBS ranking.  A comparison of these 
means shows us that contract aviators have higher averages in all TBS performance areas.  
Because several of the cohorts are not completely represented in the dataset, the means 
do not equal 50.00 as is expected.  
3. Top Third, Middle Third, Bottom Third Variables 
The CNA dataset included a variable indicating in which third each officer in the 
dataset was placed.  Three binary variables for an officer’s placement in the system of 
thirds were then created from this raw variable. 
 
Top Third: = 1 if the officer was in the top third of TBS class, = 0 otherwise 
Middle Third: = 1 if the officer was in the middle third of TBS class, = 0 otherwise 
Bottom Third: = 1 if the officer was in the bottom third of TBS class, = 0 otherwise 
 
As indicated in Table 3, top third and middle third, each account for slightly less 
than 33% of the observations, while bottom third accounts for slightly more than 33% of 
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the observations.  This is due to the fact that the TBS company staff, specifically the 
company Executive Officer, has some latitude in splitting the company into thirds for the 
Quality Spread, as it is rare that the number of ground assignable officers in a TBS 
company is exactly divisible by 3. 
4. MOS Preference Received Variables 
As part of the MOS assignment process, the students provide a list, in order of 
preference, of MOSs to which they would like to be assigned.  CNA maintains the top 3 
MOS preferences for each student.  Three binary variables were created to capture MOS 
preference and actual MOS match. 
 
First MOS Received:  = 1 if the officer received his/her first MOS, = 0 otherwise 
Top Three MOS Received: = 1 if the officer received a top three MOS, = 0 otherwise 
Other MOS Received: = 1 if the officer did not receive a top three MOS, 
    = 0 otherwise 
 
As indicated by the Table 3, 60.7% of officers received an MOS that was in their 
top 3 MOS preferences.  This number includes all contract aviators, which were 
determined to all have received their first preference of MOS.  Contract aviators account 
for 1078 observations from the data.  The percentage of ground assignable officers who 
were assigned an MOS in their top 3 preferences is 52.3%, as shown in Table 4. 
5. Commissioning Source Variables 
The CNA dataset included a commissioning source variable.  Binary variables 
were created from this variable to indicate from which program each officer was 
commissioned.  A detailed discussion of each of the commissioning programs can be 
found in Chapter II.  The commissioning source variables are: 
 
PLC:  = 1 if officer commissioned via PLC, = 0 otherwise 
OCC:  = 1 if officer commissioned via OCC, = 0 otherwise 
NROTC: = 1 if officer commissioned via NROTC, = 0 otherwise 
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MECEP: = 1 if officer commissioned via MECEP, = 0 otherwise 
ECP:  = 1 if officer commissioned via ECP, = 0 otherwise 
MCP:  = 1 if officer commissioned via MCP, = 0 otherwise 
USNA:  = 1 if officer commissioned via USNA, = 0 otherwise 
 
The mean value of each commissioning source variable in the Table 3 represents 
the percentage of officers in our data from each commissioning source.  Note that PLC 
and OCC commissions account for the majority of all officers in our data with 56% of 
officers being commissioned through these two programs.  About 15% of new officers 
enter via NROTC, 11% via USNA, and 16% via enlisted commissioning programs. 
6. The Prior Enlisted Marine Variable 
We determined that the most accurate way to capture prior enlisted Marine 
service was from the commissioning source data, specifically from the Marine Corps’ 
enlisted to officer commissioning programs.  Though Armed Forces Active Duty Base 
Date and Pay Entry Base Date data were available in the TFDW dataset, there was no 
indication in this data that the officer’s prior service was in the Marine Corps.   
Therefore, we created the prior enlisted Marine variable from the appropriate Marine 
Corps enlisted-to-officer commissioning source variables, ECP, MCP, and MECEP.  This 
variable is also a binary variable, indicating that an officer either is a prior enlisted 
Marine (prior enlisted Marine = 1) or is not a prior enlisted Marine (prior enlisted Marine 
= 0).  Using this definition, about 16.4% of new officers are prior enlisted Marines. 
7. TBS Fiscal Year Variables 
The CNA dataset included a TBS fiscal year variable.  We created binary 
variables from this variable to indicate in which fiscal year the officer attended TBS.  As 
shown in the descriptive statistics table, fiscal years 1999-2003 account for over 90% of 
the observations in the data.  Most observations from 1998 were dropped from the 
dataset, as there were few officers who attended TBS during FY 1998 who also had an 
observed fitness report in the data from MMSB.  Likewise, most officers who attended 
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TBS during FY 2004-2005 did not have observed fitness report scores in the FITREP 
data and were subsequently dropped from the dataset.  Of these few officers from FY 
1998 and FY 2004-2005 who have fitness reports, it’s likely that they received observed 
FITREPS either because they were in very short training programs or they received 
observed fitness reports before they attended their primary MOS school. 
8. Demographic Variables 
The following demographic variables were created from variables that were 
included in the CNA dataset, except for the race variables, which were created from a 
race variable in the TFDW dataset.  The CNA dataset had a race variable, but an 
appropriate entry for that variable was not available in the codebook for the CNA dataset.  
The race variable is defined based on TFDW information.  All demographic variables are 
binary variables, with the exception of Age at First Commission, which is a continuous 
variable indicating the age, in years, of the officer at the time of first commissioning.  
The means for each demographic variable in Table 3 represent the percentage of officers 
in the data who are members of that demographic category. 
 
Age at Commissioning: Continuous.  Values range from 19.75 to 35 
Male:    = 1 if officer is male, = 0 otherwise 
Female:   = 1 if officer is female, = 0 otherwise 
White:    = 1 if officer is white, = 0 otherwise 
Black:    = 1 if officer is black, = 0 otherwise 
Other Race:   = 1 if officer is neither black nor white, = 0 otherwise 
Single:    = 1 if officer is single, = 0 otherwise 
Married:   = 1 if officer is married, = 0 otherwise 
Divorced:   = 1 if officer is divorced, = 0 otherwise 
Widowed:   = 1 if officer is widowed, = 0 otherwise 
Separated:   = 1 if officer is separated, = 0 otherwise 
 
Table 3 shows that the average age at commissioning is 24.75 years, that 83.2% 
of new officers are white, 9% are black or other, 91% are male, and 73% are single. 
 46
C. CROSS-TABULATIONS BY FISCAL YEARS, GENDER, AND RACE 
1. Comparison of Means by Fiscal Year 
A preliminary analysis of fitness report scores and the TBS performance variables 
based on a comparison of the means for each variable for each Fiscal Year will provide 
us with a general understanding of the nature of the data.  Table 6 summarizes the 
dependent and key explanatory variables by entry cohort. 
Table 6.   Means of Key Variables by Fiscal Year 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Observations 12 1212 1327 1244 1038 867 399 42 
Average Cumulative 
Relative Value -1.09594 3.524841 0.351019 0.259801 0.382172 0.167872 -0.41177 0.356666 
Overall TBS Class Rank % 43.32639 49.22631 49.53305 50.03208 49.73257 49.91098 51.05184 55.03867 
Academic Ranking % 42.65602 49.10576 NA 49.81854 49.42432 48.89643 49.08112 52.32549 
Leadership Ranking % 37.01471 49.76074 NA 50.90308 50.72057 51.42943 53.1929 55.21649 
Military Skills Ranking % 61.2935 49.67545 NA 49.84796 49.21755 48.33788 48.60127 53.20707 
 
The mean values for all key TBS performance variables for the Fiscal Years 1999 
to 2002 are all very close to 50.00.  This is expected as nearly every member of these 
cohorts is included in the dataset.  For those Fiscal Years in which only a small number 
of cohort members are included in the dataset, we see that the means for the TBS 
performance variables deviate more from 50.0.  We also note that the mean for average 
cumulative relative value for FY99 is well above average at 3.52. We attribute this to the 
learning period that reporting seniors experienced as the new PES was introduced, and to 
a lack of understanding how reporting senior profiles and averages would be calculated.  
Because reporting seniors did not fully understand how their grading tendencies would be 







2. Descriptive Statistics by Gender 
In Table 7, we investigate raw differences in the key performance variables by 
gender.  A preliminary analysis of means by gender may give an indication as to what 
effects might be expected in the multivariate models estimates.   
Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics by Gender 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
             
Male Avg Cum Rel Val 5598 0.1470071 4.095758 -10 10
 Overall Rank 5598 51.03602 28.72475 0 99.61539
 Acad Rank 4380 49.76776 28.77768 0 99.61539
 Ldrshp Rank 4380 52.09026 28.66367 0 100
 Mil Skills Rank 4380 50.60521 28.57166 0 100
             
Female Avg Cum Rel Val 543 0.5134912 4.154155 -10 10
  Overall Rank 543 36.88648 26.77772 0 98.59155
  Acad Rank 434 44.9221 29.25967 0 97.64151
  Ldrshp Rank 434 38.48527 26.47681 0 97.10145
  Mil Skills Rank 434 36.69484 27.50071 0 99.59016
 
The mean value for average cumulative relative values for males is 0.15 while the 
mean for females is 0.51.  This indicates that, on average, females have fitness report 
scores that are 0.36 points higher than males.  However, mean values for every TBS 
performance variable are much higher for males than for females.  For example, the mean 
leadership ranking for males in the sample is 52.09, and for females it is 38.49.  Based on 
these means, on average males have leadership rankings that are over 11 points higher 
than females.  This seeming contradiction in means indicates that, despite worse 
performance at TBS, females tend to perform better than males once they reach the 
Operating Forces. 
3. Descriptive Statistics by Race 
Just as descriptive statistics for gender were analyzed to provide clues to what 
effects might be expected when the multivariate models are estimated, we will also 
conduct a preliminary analysis of the race variables.  North and Smith (1993) found that 
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performance varied systematically with race.  Therefore, one might expect that black 
officers will have lower average fitness report scores, and lower rankings in the TBS 
performance variables.  Table 8 contains the means of key variables by race. 
Table 8.   Descriptive Statistics by Race 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
             
White 
& Avg Cum Rel Val 5762 0.243741 4.079301 -10 10 
Other Overall Rank 5762 50.9212 28.62521 0 99.61539 
  Acad Rank 4507 50.30655 28.75712 0 99.61539 
  Ldrshp Rank 4507 51.56737 28.6408 0 100 
  Mil Skills Rank 4507 50.49644 28.5278 0 100 
              
Black Avg Cum Rel Val 379 -0.798592 4.320915 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 379 32.5094 26.46543 0 98.92473 
  Acad Rank 307 35.00774 26.37445 0 98.3871 
  Ldrshp Rank 307 40.53361 28.19179 0 99.12664 
  Mil Skills Rank 307 32.53728 26.73935 0 99.17355 
 
As the means for average cumulative relative values show for each group, black 
officers have average fitness report scores that are 1.04 points lower than officers of 
another race.  We also note that the mean value for each TBS performance variable is 
lower for black officers than for white officers.  Given the differences in these means, 
one would expect that the results of the multivariate models will find that black officers 
are lower performers in the Operating Forces unless there are other important factors that 
also differ by race. 
4. Descriptive Statistics by TBS Fiscal Year 
Table 9 below provides means of key variables by TBS fiscal year, or by cohort. 
Table 9.   Descriptive Statistics by TBS Fiscal Year 
FY Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
              
98 Avg Cum Rel Val 12 -1.09594 3.608065 -6.14167 4.676667 
  Overall Rank 12 43.32639 30.019 2.109703 94.92754 
  Acad Rank 12 42.65602 31.68168 2.531647 95.78059 
  Ldrshp Rank 12 37.01471 30.03622 5.439331 94.92754 
  Mil Skills Rank 12 61.2935 32.47416 5.485229 96.73913 
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99 Avg Cum Rel Val 1212 -0.05528 3.524841 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 1212 49.22631 28.71976 0 99.58678 
  Acad Rank 1212 49.10576 28.76673 0 99.58678 
  Ldrshp Rank 1212 49.76074 28.42645 0 99.58678 
    
  Mil Skills Rank 1212 49.67545 28.77165 0 99.58678 
00 Avg Cum Rel Val 1327 0.351019 3.750296 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 1327 49.53305 28.92374 0 99.57983 
  Acad Rank 0 NA NA NA NA 
  Ldrshp Rank 0 NA NA NA NA 
  Mil Skills Rank 0 NA NA NA NA 
01 Avg Cum Rel Val 1244 0.259801 4.003775 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 1244 50.03208 28.7052 0 99.59514 
  Acad Rank 1244 49.81854 28.64463 0 99.59016 
  Ldrshp Rank 1244 50.90308 28.62004 0 99.59514 
  Mil Skills Rank 1244 49.84796 28.58418 0 100 
02 Avg Cum Rel Val 1038 0.382172 4.211754 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 1038 49.73257 28.45681 0 99.61539 
  Acad Rank 1038 49.42432 28.50649 0 99.61539 
  Ldrshp Rank 1038 50.72057 28.66325 0 100 
  Mil Skills Rank 1038 49.21755 28.40922 0 99.61539 
03 Avg Cum Rel Val 867 0.167872 4.558695 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 867 49.91098 29.44318 0 99.57627 
  Acad Rank 867 48.89643 29.40975 0 99.57627 
  Ldrshp Rank 867 51.42943 29.16498 0 99.57627 
  Mil Skills Rank 867 48.33788 29.09411 0 99.57627 
04 Avg Cum Rel Val 399 -0.41177 5.415968 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 399 51.05184 29.24809 0 99.59016 
  Acad Rank 399 49.08112 29.55551 0 99.59016 
  Ldrshp Rank 399 53.1929 29.14275 0.409836 99.59016 
  Mil Skills Rank 399 48.60127 29.42734 0 99.46524 
05 Avg Cum Rel Val 42 0.356666 5.32504 -10 10 
  Overall Rank 42 55.03867 26.9477 2.155174 98.27586 
  Acad Rank 42 52.32549 28.17274 1.724136 98.53658 
  Ldrshp Rank 42 55.21649 28.861 0.862068 99.56896 
  Mil Skills Rank 42 53.20707 27.23558 11.21951 99.57265 
 
Note how the number of observations by fiscal year begins to decline as the data 
progress toward the end of the observation period.  The closer an officer’s commissioning 
date is to the end of the observation period, the less time that officer had to receive an 
observed fitness report.  Hence, the number of observations becomes smaller the closer the 
FY is to the end of the observation period.  Also, note that only 12 officers from the TBS 
FY98 cohort are included in the dataset.  Members of this FY cohort did not have enough 
time to have an observed report recorded before the beginning of the observation period. 
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V. PERFORMANCE MODELS AND HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS 
A. PERFORMANCE MODELS 
1. Performance model #1.  Independent Variables:  The three areas of 
TBS performance, other-than-top-three MOS preference, 
commissioning sources 
The primary performance model was specified so as to analyze the effect of the 
three areas of evaluation at TBS on later performance.  Other key explanatory variables 
include the other-than-top-3-MOS preference variable which demonstrates the effect on 
performance of an officer not receiving an MOS that was in his top three MOS 
preferences. 
Model #1 is specified as: 
Average Cumulative Relative Value = f (Academic Rank, Leadership 
Rank, Military Skills Rank, Other MOS, Female, OCC, NROTC, MECEP, 
ECP, USNA, MCP, Age at First Commission, Black, Other Race, 
Married, Divorced, Widowed) 
Table 10 indicates the hypothesized effects of selected explanatory variables in 
the model.  A plus sign indicates an expected positive effect on average cumulative 
relative value of Fitness Report scores, and a minus sign indicates an expected negative 
effect. The first column identifies the reference category for each group (e.g. the 
reference group for race is white).  We indicate our hypothesized effects of these 
explanatory variables as they relate to the reference group and with all other explanatory 
variables held constant. 
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Table 10.   Hypothesized Effect of Explanatory Variables 
Hypothesized effects of Explanatory Variables 
 on Average Cumulative Relative Values 
  
Reference Group Explanatory Variable Effect 
  Academic Ranking + 
  Leadership Ranking + 
  Military Skills Ranking + 
  Top Third + 
Middle Third   NA 
  Bottom Third - 
Top 3 MOS   NA 
  Other than top 3 MOS - 
Male   NA 
  Female - 
PLC   NA 
  OCC - 
  NROTC + 
  MECEP + 
  ECP + 
  USNA + 
  MCP + 
Non-prior enlisted Marine   NA 
  Prior enlisted Marine + 
  Age at First Commission - 
White   NA 
  Black - 
  Other Race - 
Single   NA 
  Married + 
  Divorced + 
 
We expect that each of the three areas of TBS performance will have a positive 
predictive effect on later performance.  That is to say that the higher a student’s rank is in 
each of the three areas of evaluation, the higher we expect the average cumulative 
relative value of the officer’s Fitness Reports.  The rationale is that the skills that are 
being evaluated at The Basic School will also be the skills that will translate into better 
performance in the operating forces.  Of these, we expect that the leadership ranking will 
have the greatest predictive properties.  This means that we hypothesize that the 
estimated coefficient obtained for the leadership ranking will predict the greatest positive 
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change in average cumulative relative value FITREP scores (i.e., have the largest 
magnitude of the three TBS performance variables).  This hypothesized effect is due to 
the nature of the leadership evaluation at TBS, where the officer’s leadership skills and 
acumen are evaluated by an experienced captain, the Staff Platoon Commander, who 
should possess the judgment and ability to discern and judge the level of the 
characteristics and traits that determine performance of junior officers in the operating 
forces.  We believe that Staff Platoon Commanders do an excellent job of making this 
evaluation; therefore, we expect the leadership ranking to be strongly predictive of future 
performance. 
We also expect academics and military skills to be predictive of later officer 
performance, but not as strongly as leadership skills.  Further, we expect that academics 
will be more predictive of later performance than military skills.  Ergun found the TBS 
class rank is associated with better performance in the operating forces as indicated by 
promotion, retention, and PI score. Furthermore, he found that academic and military 
skills scores at TBS were highly correlated to overall performance at TBS. Other studies 
have used SAT scores or GCT scores as proxies for aptitude and found that aptitude is a 
significant predictor of performance. North and Smith converted GCT scores to EL 
scores and found these scores to be highly correlated with performance at TBS.  
Therefore, we believe that academic scores are closely tied to GCT scores and since GCT 
scores are significant predictors of future performance, academic scores at TBS will be 
more predictive of future performance than military skills. 
An officer who does not receive an MOS that is among his top three MOS 
preferences is expected to have significantly lower average cumulative Fitness Report 
scores than the officer who does receive an MOS in his top-three preference list.  This 
hypothesized effect is due to the satisfaction attained when one is awarded his or her 
MOS of choice.  The officer should be happier, and thereby more effective and 
productive, when assigned an MOS that is higher on that officer’s list of preferences. 
We hypothesize that all commissioning sources, particularly those that are 
enlisted-to-commissioning sources, will have higher average cumulative relative values 
than PLC, with the exception of OCC.  Previous studies have found TBS scores of OCC 
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graduates to be lower than those of other commissioning sources (Ergun, 2003).  We 
therefore hypothesize that this performance difference at TBS will carry over into 
performance in the operating forces. 
For the demographic variables, we expect that females, blacks, and members of 
races other than black or white will all have lower average cumulative fitness report 
scores than male officers and white officers, respectively.  We hypothesize this effect 
based on the previous findings of North and Smith (1993).  This study found that there 
was a performance gap between minority and majority officer candidates at OCS and 
minority and majority officers at TBS.  Minority male officers were 8 percentage points 
less likely than whites to complete OCS and at TBS African-American officers had a 
class rank percentile 22 points below whites.  The raw data that North and Smith gathered 
also indicated that women have 20 percentage point higher OCS and pre-commissioning 
attrition than men.  Therefore, we believe that the attrition and performance trends at 
OCS and TBS will continue throughout an officer’s career and will impact fitness report 
scores.  Also, we expect that as one gets older and more mature, performance in the 
Operating Forces will improve and thus average cumulative relative values will be higher 
for older officers relative to the performance of younger officers.  Lastly, we expect that 
married and divorced officers will have higher cumulative relative values than those of 
single officers due to an increased maturity level that comes with either having a family, 
or having gone through a marriage and divorce. 
2. Performance Model #2.  Independent variables:  The three areas of 
TBS performance, other-than-top-3 MOS preference, prior enlisted 
Marine 
This model is specified as: 
Average Cumulative Relative Value = f (Academic Rank, Leadership 
Rank, Military Skills Rank, Other MOS, Female, Prior Enlisted Marine, 
Age at First Commission, Black, Other Race, Married, Divorced, 
Widowed) 
In Model #2, commissioning sources are eliminated so that we can introduce the 
Prior Enlisted Marine variable into the model, and thereby capture the effect on 
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performance of prior enlisted Marine experience.  The prior enlisted Marine variable is 
created from three of the commissioning source variables (ECP, MECEP, MCP), and, 
therefore, poses a collinearity problem that must be avoided by removing the 
commissioning source variables from this model.  We expect that prior enlisted Marine 
experience will have a positive effect on average cumulative relative values, and that all 
other explanatory variables in the model will retain the same hypothesized effects as 
above.  This hypothesis is based on the intuition that officers with prior Marine 
experience will have greater success due to an understanding of the organization, and 
experience dealing with the interpersonal and organizational problems inherent in the 
organization.  Previous studies have also found that prior enlisted Marine experience is 
predictive of better performance at TBS (Finley, 2002) and we expect that better 
performance at TBS will carry over to better performance in the operating forces. 
3. Performance Model #3.  Independent variables:  TBS performance in 
thirds, other-than-top-three MOS preference, commissioning sources 
This model is specified as: 
Average Cumulative Relative Value = f (Top Third Performer, Bottom 
Third Performer, Other MOS, Female, OCC, NROTC, MECEP, ECP, 
USNA, MCP, Age at First Commission, Black, Other Race, Married, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
In Model #3, to capture the effect of the officer’s placement in the system of 
thirds, we eliminate Academics, Military Skills, and Leadership rankings from the model 
and introduce variables for Top Third and Bottom Third.  Collinearity exists between the 
“thirds” variables and the TBS performance variables, as placement in the thirds is 
determined by class ranking, which is determined by the three areas of evaluation.    
Middle third is excluded because being a member of the Middle third is part of the 
reference group’s profile, as depicted in Table 10.   
Again, we hypothesize that the effect of the other variables in the model will 




performer will have higher average cumulative relative values, and conversely, a bottom 
third performer will have lower average cumulative relative values, as compared to those 
in the middle third.  
4. Performance Model #4.  Independent variables:  TBS performance in 
thirds, other-than-top-3 MOS preference, prior enlisted Marine 
This model is specified as: 
Average Cumulative Relative Value = f (Top Third Performer, Bottom 
Third Performer, Other MOS, Female, Prior Enlisted Marine, Age at First 
Commission, Black, Other Race, Married, Divorced, Widowed) 
In this specification, commissioning sources are replaced by the prior enlisted 
Marine variable.  This model will be used to note any differences between the effect of 
prior enlisted Marine experience in models that include the three areas of TBS 
performance, and this model in which we are examining the effect in the system of thirds.  
We still expect that prior enlisted Marine experience will have a positive effect on 
average cumulative fitness report scores, and that the other hypothesized effects for the 
remaining explanatory variables in the model will remain the same. 
5. Performance Model #5.  Independent variables:  TBS final overall 
class ranking, other-than-top-3 MOS preference, commissioning 
sources 
This model is specified as: 
Average Cumulative Relative Value = f (Final Overall Class Rank, Other 
MOS, Female, OCC, NROTC, MECEP, ECP, USNA, MCP, Age at First 
Commission, Black, Other Race, Married, Divorced, Widowed) 
In this model, final overall class rank now becomes the primary explanatory 
variable, replacing TBS performance in thirds.  The effect of TBS final overall class rank 
is hypothesized to be positive.  We expect that final overall class rank will have an effect 
that is slightly larger than the effect of the leadership ranking, as the overall class ranking 
is determined by the three areas of evaluation, of which leadership makes up the largest 
percentage. 
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6. Performance Model #6.  Independent variables:  TBS final overall 
class ranking, other-than-top-3 MOS preference, prior enlisted 
Marine 
This model is specified as: 
Average Cumulative Relative Value = f (Final Overall Class Rank, Other 
MOS, Female, Prior Enlisted Marine, Age at First Commission, Black, 
Other Race, Married, Divorced, Widowed) 
In this model, we introduce the prior enlisted Marine variable in place of the 
commissioning source variables.  This will allow us to evaluate any changes in the effect 
of prior enlisted Marine experience when evaluating the effect of final overall TBS class 
ranking instead of the three areas of evaluation or placement in the system of thirds. 
B. SECONDARY MODEL 
The purpose of this secondary model is to evaluate any change in the effects of 
TBS performance on junior officers over time.  As discussed in Chapter IV, and shown in 
Table 5, fitness report data from MMSB included information on each fitness report, to 
include the rank of the Marine Reported On for each report.  To evaluate whether the 
effects of performance at TBS change over an officer’s career, for example whether the 
effect of the leadership ranking begins to fade as an officer becomes further removed 
from The Basic School, we specified three separate models and compared the coefficients 
of the TBS performance variables in each model.  These models were specified just as 
Performance Model #1 is specified, but models are estimated for average cumulative 
relative value separately for second lieutenants, for first lieutenants, and for captains. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter provides the model specifications and the intent of each specification 
for the 6 performance models used in this analysis.  Our hypothesized effects are based 
upon findings of previous research, as well as our experience, intuition, and 
understanding of officer performance at TBS, and officer performance in the operating 
forces.  We also describe a secondary model that is used to evaluate changes in the 
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effects of the explanatory variables over time.  Last, we provide the characteristics of the 
reference group which provides the baseline from which to measure the magnitude of the 
effect of an explanatory variable, holding all other variables constant. 
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VI. MULTIVARIATE MODEL RESULTS 
A. PRIMARY PERFORMANCE MODEL RESULTS 
1. Performance Model #1.  Independent Variables:  The Three Areas of 
TBS Performance, Other-Than-Top-Three MOS Preference, 
Commissioning Sources 
The dependent variable in this model is the average cumulative relative value 
derived from fitness reports.  The coefficients of the explanatory variables will 
demonstrate the effect that the explanatory variables have on average cumulative relative 
value, in points.  Results of estimating this multivariate model are presented in Table 7  
Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables included in the model specification.  
Column 2 lists the coefficients and standard errors for each of the corresponding 
variables in Column 1.  The data used in estimating the coefficients in Column 2 included 
contract aviators (the unrestricted dataset).  Column 3 lists the coefficients and standard 
errors for each of the corresponding variables in Column 1, and only data on ground 
assignable officers was used in estimating the coefficients in Column 3 (the restricted 
dataset). 
The F-statistics for the unrestricted and restricted versions of Model #1 are 49.14 
and 48.02, respectively, with corresponding P-values of 0.0000 for both.  Therefore, we 
are confident that are model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that the model’s 
results are reliable.  The r-squared values for the unrestricted and restricted models are 
0.15 and 0.17, respectively.  This tells us that we are capturing roughly 15-17% of those 
observable and measurable things that determine future performance.  Since we are 
capturing only 15-17% of these factors, there are likely many other factors that we are not 





Table 11.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=Ground 
Assignables 
 
Academics class rank - 
percent 
0.00775 0.01000 
 (0.00252)*** (0.00273)*** 
Leadership class rank 
- percent 
0.04545 0.04692 
 (0.00239)*** (0.00261)*** 
Mil Skills class rank 
- percent 
-0.00011 -0.00026 
 (0.00262) (0.00286) 
MOS not in top 3 prefs 
rcvd 
-0.07475 -0.22336 
 (0.12678) (0.13177)* 
Female officer 1.24943 1.16402 
 (0.20287)*** (0.21033)*** 
OCC commission 0.29722 0.51342 
 (0.15970)* (0.17668)*** 
NROTC commission 0.42193 0.39746 
 (0.18365)** (0.20010)** 
MECEP commission 0.85587 1.01122 
 (0.24384)*** (0.26200)*** 
ECP commission 0.57109 0.72515 




 (0.20321)** (0.22637)*** 
MCP commission 0.74770 0.84518 
 (0.43664)* (0.45223)* 
Age when commissioned -0.01858 -0.03208 
 (0.02861) (0.03081) 
Race Black -0.66571 -0.78702 
 (0.23717)*** (0.24624)*** 
Race all others 0.04959 0.01681 
 (0.33052) (0.34056) 
Married at 1st record 0.81555 0.88488 
 (0.16239)*** (0.17556)*** 
Divorced at 1st record 0.81511 0.70552 
 (0.43339)* (0.46263) 
Widowed at 1st record 1.28976 1.15985 
 (3.87895) (3.85759) 
Constant -2.70347 -2.47660 
 (0.68890)*** (0.74211)*** 
Observations 4757 3956 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
F(17, 4739) = 49.14 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(17, 3938) = 48.02 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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a. Effects of the TBS Performance Variables 
TBS performance variables are expressed in ranking percentage; therefore, 
the interpretation of the coefficients of the TBS performance variables is the effect of a 
one percentage point change in TBS performance on average cumulative fitness report 
scores.  For example, the coefficient of Academic Ranking in the unrestricted model is 
.00775; therefore, we interpret that coefficient to mean that a 1 point increase in academic 
ranking predicts a .00775 point increase in average cumulative relative value, evaluated 
at the mean value of the average cumulative relative value.   These effects are expected, 
holding all other explanatory variables constant. 
Academic ranking has a small practical significance and predicts a very 
small change in average relative cumulative value, evaluated at the mean, for a relatively 
large change in academic ranking.  For example, if an officer were to improve his 
academic ranking from last in his TBS company to first in his TBS company, that would 
predict a 0.775 point increase in average cumulative relative value in the unrestricted 
model, and a 1.0 point increase in average relative cumulative value in the restricted 
model, all else equal.  Because we evaluate this change at the mean value of the average 
cumulative relative value, we would expect the mean value of average cumulative 
relative value to increase from 90.179 (the baseline mean) to 90.854. 
Leadership ranking has a coefficient that is four and a half times greater 
than that of the academic ranking and is also statistically significant at the 1% level.  For 
every 1 point increase in leadership ranking, we expect a 0.045 point increase in average 
cumulative relative value, evaluated at the mean.  The officer who increases his 
leadership ranking from last in his TBS company to first in his TBS company would 
expect average cumulative relative values that are 4.5 points greater in the unrestricted 
model, and nearly 4.7 points greater in the restricted model, all other variables held 
constant.  Perhaps, more realistically, we can compare two officers who are identical (i.e. 
members of the reference group, with the exception of their leadership rankings).  Officer 
A has a leadership ranking that is 50% lower than Officer B’s leadership ranking.  Our 
model predicts that Officer B’s average cumulative relative value would be 2.5 points 
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higher than Officer A’s average cumulative relative value.  Again, as these effects are 
measured at the mean value of the average cumulative relative value, we would expect 
that Officer B’s average cumulative relative value to be 92.679 (90.179 + 2.5). 
The military skills ranking variable was not statistically significant at any 
level, and, therefore, is considered to be no different from zero.  That is to say that 
military skills ranking has no effect on average cumulative relative values. 
b. Effect of the MOS Preference Received Variable 
In the unrestricted model, Column 2 of Table 7 receiving an MOS not in 
the officer’s top three MOS preferences was not statistically significant at any level and, 
therefore, cannot be said to have any effect on average cumulative relative value.  
However, when contract aviators are removed from the sample and we estimate the 
model in Column 3 restricted to a sample of ground assignable officers, the other-than-
top-3 MOS preference variable becomes significant at the 10% level.  As this is a binary 
variable, meaning an officer did or did not get assigned an MOS in his top 3 MOS 
preferences, the coefficient of the variable is its predicted effect, all else held constant.  
Therefore, the effect of this variable in the restricted model is -0.22.  The interpretation of 
this coefficient is that, holding all other explanatory variables constant, an officer who is 
assigned an MOS that is not in his top 3 MOS preferences is expected to have an average 
cumulative relative value that is 0.22 points lower than the officer who was assigned a 
top 3 MOS preference.  Thus, at the mean value of average cumulative relative value, this 
officer’s value would drop from 90.179 to 89.959. 
We believe that this variable is not statistically significant in the 
unrestricted model due to the fact that contract aviators are included in that data, and 
contract aviators must be considered to have received their first MOS choice.  Ground 
assignable officers who are higher in their respective third will more than likely be 
assigned higher MOS preferences and, therefore, will be expected to be better performers 
in the operating forces, since they are better performers at TBS.  This is not true of 
contract aviators, as they are no more or less likely to be “assigned” their top MOS  
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preference, regardless where they rank in the system of thirds, or where they rank lineally 
in the company.  In effect, the effect on future performance of being assigned a top MOS 
preference is masked for contract aviators. 
Though this variable in the restricted model has the expected negative 
coefficient, it is a surprise that the effect is not greater.  Our hypothesis was that not being 
assigned an MOS in the top 3 MOS preferences would reduce performance in the 
operating forces due to job dissatisfaction.  After all, this would be an officer who was 
ostensibly working in a job that he didn’t really want at all. 
c. Effects of Commissioning Source Variables 
Relative to the PLC commissioning source, and holding all other 
explanatory variables constant, we see that all other commissioning sources predict 
higher average cumulative relative values.  In the unrestricted model, the enlisted-to-
officer commissioning sources (ECP, MCP, MECEP) have the largest effects.  ECP is 
statistically significant at the 10% level, and has a coefficient of 0.57.  All else constant, 
we expect an officer commissioned via ECP to have average cumulative relative values 
that are 0.57 points higher than PLC.  MCP predicts a 0.75 point increase in average 
cumulative relative value than PLC (statistically significant at the 10% level), and 
MECEP predicts a 0.86 point higher score than PLC (statistically significant at the 1% 
level). 
An officer commissioned via the Naval Academy is predicted to have 
average cumulative relative values that are 0.52 points higher than PLC.  This result is 
significant at the 5% level.  The next largest effect is predicted by NROTC at a positive 
0.42 point difference, followed by OCC with a predicted +0.30 difference.  The positive 
coefficient of OCC is surprising, given that a previous study demonstrated that officers 
commissioned via OCC perform more poorly at TBS than officers who are commissioned 
via PLC (Ergun, 2003.)  In fact, Ergun demonstrated that officers commissioned via OCC 




commissioned via OCC perform better in the Operating Forces because they are 
generally older and have more life and work experience than officers commissioned via 
PLC. 
The positive coefficients for the enlisted-to-officer commissioning sources 
are certainly expected.  There is a demonstrated benefit to understanding the 
organization, the culture, and the language.  Also, the prior enlisted Marine officer is seen 
as credible by enlisted Marines.  We believe enlisted Marines have more respect for 
officers who were once enlisted Marines themselves.  We believe the experience that 
these Marine officers possess also makes them more effective once they reach the 
operating forces. 
It is also expected that Naval Academy and NROTC officers would have 
higher average cumulative relative values than PLC and OCC officers.  The Naval 
Academy requires that Marine option Midshipmen attend various Marine Corps specific 
training events, specifically the Leatherneck program that is executed at The Basic 
School.  Naval Academy graduates are also accustomed to the regimented and disciplined 
lifestyle of the military.  NROTC officers have the benefit of some military acculturation 
through the classes and drills that are part of the NROTC program.  They are, in essence, 
being acclimatized to the military and to the Marine Corps by active duty Marines on 
each respective NROTC staff.  By contrast, the only Marine Corps experience that an 
officer commissioned via OCC or PLC has is the experience of OCS, TBS, and then the 
follow-on MOS school. 
In the restricted model in Column 3 of Table 7 we observe that the 
estimated coefficients become larger, with the exception of NROTC.  We also observe 
that three of the six commissioning source variables have a higher level of statistical 
significance.  Again, it appears that the effect of including contract aviators in the model 
is to mask some of the effect of commissioning sources on average cumulative relative 
values. 
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d. Effects of the Gender 
The largest observed effect of all the binary demographic characteristics is for 
the variable “female.”  This variable has a coefficient of 1.25 in the unrestricted model in 
Column 2, and a coefficient of 1.16 in the restricted model in Column 3.  This variable is 
significant at the 1% level for both models.  This implies that, all else equal, being female 
will increase the average FITREP score by 1.16 to 1.25 points.  Thus, at the mean, average 
cumulative relative value for a female officer would be 91.425 compared to 90.179 for a 
male officer.  This result is somewhat surprising both in the magnitude of the effect and in 
the fact that it is positive. 
This study does not address why females have higher average FITREP scores 
than males, but several possibilities could be examined.  Perhaps this effect is a function of 
some unobservable characteristics that are associated with female officers who are 
commissioned via the PLC program, or perhaps young female officers are more mature than 
their male counterparts and perform at a higher level when on the job.  Another explanation 
may be that females are concentrated in MOSs that have higher average fitrep scores for all 
officers in those MOSs. 
e. Effects of the Race Variables 
The variable “black” has a coefficient of -0.67 in the unrestricted model and a 
coefficient of -0.79 in the restricted model; therefore, if an officer has all the attributes of the 
reference group, but is black instead of white, that officer is expected to have average 
FITREP scores that are -0.67 to -0.79 points lower than his white counterpart.  Thus, when 
evaluated at the mean, the black officer would have an average cumulative relative value that 
is 90.179 – 0.67, or 89.509.  The variable “otherrace,” which is the variable that denotes an 
officer who is neither black or white, was not statistically significant at any level in either 
model.  Again, this study does not analyze why black officers have lower FITREP scores 
than white officers, but one could explore several possibilities.  This effect could again be a 
function of unobservable characteristics unique to black officer who are commissioned via 
the PLC program, or it could also be an MOS specific effect.  There may also be 
demographic differences that account for this effect. 
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f. Effects of Marital Status Variables 
The coefficient for the variable “married” is 0.82 in the unrestricted model 
and 0.88 in the restricted model.  This indicates that married officers are expected to have 
FITREP scores that are 0.82 to 0.88 points higher than the reference group, all else 
constant.  This variable is significant at the 1% level in both models.  Thus, the married 
officer is expected to have an average cumulative relative value that is 90.179 + 0.82, or 
90.999. 
This result is not surprising, as one would expect a married officer to have 
a greater incentive to be a higher performer than his single counterpart.  Married officers 
are generally older, more mature, have people who depend on them to succeed, and are 
more adept at dealing with interpersonal conflicts due to their marriage experience.  The 
coefficient for the variable “divorced” was only statistically significant in the all 
unrestricted model, and was significant at the 10% level.  Its coefficient is 0.82, 
indicating that divorced officers are expected to have higher average FITREP scores than 
the reference group, all else constant. 
Again, one can look to the maturity and experience level of those who 
have been through a marriage and subsequently divorced.  Many of these officers also 
have the incentive of people depending on them as well, as many divorced officers are 
still responsible for providing monetary support to children. 
2. Performance Model #2.  Independent Variables:  The Three Areas of 
TBS Performance, Other-Than-Top-3 MOS Preference, Prior 
Enlisted Marine 
The dependent variable in this model remains the average cumulative relative 
value derived from the fitness reports.  The major change in the specification of this 
model is that the commissioning source variables have been replaced by the prior enlisted 
Marine variable.  As the prior enlisted variable is created from the ECP, MCP, and 
MECEP variables, to include the prior enlisted variable in the previous model 
specification would create a collinearity problem.  Results of estimating this multivariate 
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model are depicted in Table 8.  Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables included in 
the model specification.  Column 2 lists the coefficients and standard errors for each of 
the corresponding variables in Column 1.  The data used in estimating the coefficients in 
Column 2 included contract aviators (the unrestricted dataset).  Column 3 lists the 
coefficients and standard errors for each of the corresponding variables in Column 1, and 
only data on ground assignable officers was used in estimating the coefficients in Column 
3 (the restricted dataset). 
The F-statistics for the unrestricted and restricted versions of Model #2 are 68.69 
and 66.67, respectively, with corresponding P-values of 0.0000 for both.  Therefore, we 
are confident that are model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that the model’s 
results are reliable.  The r-squared values for the unrestricted and restricted models are 
0.15 and 0.17, respectively.  This tells us that we are capturing roughly 15-17% of those 
observable and measurable things that determine future performance.  Since we are 
capturing only 15-17% of these factors, there are likely many other factors that we are not 

















Table 12.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 




Academics class rank - 
percent 
0.00815 0.01034 
 (0.00251)*** (0.00273)*** 
Leadership class rank 
- percent 
0.04555 0.04680 
 (0.00238)*** (0.00260)*** 
Mil Skills class rank 
- percent 
0.00015 -0.00004 
 (0.00261) (0.00285) 
MOS not in top 3 prefs 
rcvd 
-0.08303 -0.23742 
 (0.12678) (0.13180)* 
Female officer 1.32586 1.24841 
 (0.20122)*** (0.20841)*** 
Prior Enlisted - from 
ECP,MCP,MECEP 
0.55051 0.55429 
 (0.19542)*** (0.20818)*** 
Age when commissioned -0.02310 -0.02104 
 (0.02523) (0.02725) 
Race Black -0.65890 -0.79033 
 (0.23688)*** (0.24603)*** 
Race all others 0.03732 0.01169 
 (0.33042) (0.34049) 
Married at 1st record 0.78531 0.83428 
 (0.16138)*** (0.17458)*** 
Divorced at 1st record 0.80356 0.68188 
 (0.43158)* (0.46090) 
Widowed at 1st record 1.38441 1.26331 
 (3.88096) (3.86203) 
Constant -2.38081 -2.41409 
 (0.62509)*** (0.67514)*** 
Observations 4757 3956 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
F(12, 4744) = 68.69 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(12, 3943) = 66.67 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
* significant at 10% 
 
** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
 69
a. Effect of the Prior Enlisted Marine Variable 
The Prior Enlisted variable is significant at the 1% level in both models, 
and its coefficient is positive.  The coefficient of the prior enlisted variable predicts that, 
all else constant, an officer who was formerly an enlisted Marine would have average 
FITREP scores that are 0.55 points higher than his non-prior enlisted Marine 
counterparts.  This result is not surprising given the coefficients from the previous model 
for ECP, MCP, and MECEP were all statistically significant and positive.  In effect, this 
coefficient simply reflects the weighted average of the coefficients of MECEP, ECP, and 
MCP in Model #1. 
b. Effects of the Remaining Explanatory Variables 
A comparison of the coefficients that are held over from the previous 
model reveal that there are no substantial changes in the significance or magnitude of the  
variables from this model to the previous model. 
3. Performance Model #3.  Independent Variables:  TBS Performance in 
Thirds, Other-Than-Top-Three MOS Preference, Commissioning 
Sources 
The dependent variable in this model is still the average cumulative relative 
derived from the fitness reports.  The TBS performance variables (leadership rank, 
military skills rank, and academics rank) are replaced by the variables that signify an 
officer’s standing in the system of thirds.  The reference group specification is that the 
officer is in the middle third; therefore, membership in the top or bottom third is depicted 
by binary variables for being in the top third or the bottom third.  The TBS performance 
variables cannot be included in the same model as the dummy variables for the officers 
standing in the system of thirds because the officer’s standing in the system of thirds is 
determined by the overall grade point average, which is a composite of the three areas of 
evaluation.  The results of estimating this multivariate model are depicted in Table 13.  
Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables included in the model specification.  
Column 2 lists the coefficients and standard errors for each of the corresponding 
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variables in Column 1.  The data used in estimating the coefficients in Column 2 included 
contract aviators (the unrestricted dataset).  Column 3 lists the coefficients and standard 
errors for each of the corresponding variables in Column 1, and only data on ground 
assignable officers was used in estimating the coefficients in Column 3 (the restricted 
dataset). 
The F-statistics for the unrestricted and restricted versions of Model #3 are 51.42 
and 50.37, respectively, with corresponding P-values of 0.0000 for both.  Therefore, we 
are confident that the model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that the model’s 
results are reliable.  The r-squared values for the unrestricted and restricted models are 
0.12 and 0.14, respectively.  This tells us that we are capturing roughly 12-14% of those 
observable and measurable things that determine future performance.  Since we are 
capturing only 12-14% of these factors, there are likely many other factors that we are not 
capturing in our data, or that cannot be observed and measured, that are also predictive of 
future performance. 
Table 13.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=Ground 
Assignables 
 
Top Third 1.03101 1.17010 
 (0.12577)*** (0.14059)*** 
Bottom Third -1.76545 -1.84852 
 (0.12425)*** (0.13554)*** 
MOS not in top 3 prefs 
rcvd 
0.07068 -0.20988 
 (0.10325) (0.11037)* 
Female officer 0.94883 0.83736 
 (0.18040)*** (0.18834)*** 
OCC commission 0.25676 0.41660 
 (0.14169)* (0.15771)*** 
NROTC commission 0.53667 0.53465 
 (0.16254)*** (0.17841)*** 
MECEP commission 1.30069 1.36789 
 (0.21674)*** (0.23458)*** 
ECP commission 0.58289 0.62355 
 (0.28606)** (0.29980)** 
USNA commission 0.69122 0.84516 
 (0.17958)*** (0.20225)*** 
MCP commission 1.22204 1.29220 
 (0.38593)*** (0.40152)*** 
Age when commissioned -0.02857 -0.04065 
 (0.02559) (0.02766) 
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Race Black -0.64997 -0.75132 
 (0.21244)*** (0.22162)*** 
Race all others -0.09439 -0.16720 
 (0.29228) (0.30407) 
Married at 1st record 0.81583 0.89925 
 (0.14246)*** (0.15552)*** 
Divorced at 1st record 0.97103 0.82681 
 (0.37605)*** (0.39974)** 
Widowed at 1st record 1.15399 0.93737 
 (3.86231) (3.85183) 
Constant 0.42704 0.93421 
 (0.60958) (0.65978) 
Observations 5976 4929 
R-squared 0.12 0.14 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
F(16, 5959) = 51.42 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(16, 4912) = 50.37 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
* significant at 10% 
 
** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
a. Effects of the Placement in the System of Thirds 
The bottom third and top third variables are statistically significant in both 
models at the 1% level.  The coefficient for the top third variable is 1.03 for the all PMOS 
model and 1.17 for the model restricted to ground assignable officers.  The model 
predicts that an officer who finishes TBS in the top third of his company will receive 
higher average FITREP scores than the officer who finishes TBS in the middle third, all 
other variables held constant.  The model also predicts that the officer who finishes in the 
bottom third of his TBS class will receive average FITREP scores that are substantially 
lower than the middle third officer.  The coefficient for bottom third is -1.77 for the 
unrestricted model and -1.85 for the restricted model.  When we calculate the total 
difference in coefficients for top third and bottom third, we see that the difference in 
predicted average FITREP scores between an officer who finishes in the top third of his 
TBS class and an officer who finishes in the bottom third of his TBS class is nearly 3 
points. 
Of course, these coefficients are not surprising given that an officer’s 
standing in the system of thirds is determined by his overall TBS class standing  
percentage, which is a composite of that officer’s leadership, academics, and military 
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skills grades.  However, what is noteworthy about these coefficients is that these results 
make the case that the quality spread based on TBS performance does indeed provide a 
relatively equal distribution of higher performing, average performing, and lower 
performing officers to each ground assignable MOS, based on performance in the 
Operating Forces.  This is the stated goal of the quality spread. 
b. Changes in Effects of Other Significant Variables 
The coefficient for the female variable has decreased by approximately 0.3 
points when compared to the first model specification in which the TBS performance 
variables were used instead of the thirds variables.  This suggests that the effect of the 
thirds accounts for some of the effect of gender.  This may indicate that there is a 
relationship between an officer being female and how that officer will finish in the 
system of thirds. 
Most commissioning source variables coefficients have increased in size 
in this model when compared to the first model.  Those commissioning sources that are 
associated with Marine Corps or military experience had the most dramatic increases.  
For example, in the previous model the coefficient for MECEP was 0.86 for the all 
PMOS model and 1.01 for the ground assignable model.  However, in this model those 
coefficients increase to 1.30 and 1.37, respectively.  This suggests that an officer’s 
ranking in leadership, academics, and military skills accounts for more of the effect of 
having Marine Corps experience than does an officer’s standing in the system of thirds.  
Other statistically significant variables had little change in their coefficients in this 
model. 
4. Performance Model #4.  Independent Variables:  TBS Performance in 
Thirds, Other-Than-Top-3 MOS Preference, Prior Enlisted Marine 
This model examines the effects of prior enlisted experience, and an officer’s 
standing in the system of thirds.  Again, commissioning source variables are omitted due 
to collinearity with the prior enlisted variable, and TBS performance variables are 
omitted so that the thirds variables can be estimated.  The results of estimating this 
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multivariate model are depicted in Table 14.  Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables 
included in the model specification.  Column 2 lists the coefficients and standard errors 
for each of the corresponding variables in Column 1.  The data used in estimating the 
coefficients in Column 2 included contract aviators (the unrestricted dataset).  Column 3  
lists the coefficients and standard errors for each of the corresponding variables in 
Column 1, and only data on ground assignable officers was used in estimating the 
coefficients in Column 3 (the restricted dataset). 
The F-statistics for the unrestricted and restricted versions of Model #4 are 72.25 
and 70.46, respectively, with corresponding P-values of 0.0000 for both.  Therefore, we 
are confident that the model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that the model’s 
results are reliable.  The r-squared values for the unrestricted and restricted models are 
0.12 and 0.14, respectively.  This tells us that we are capturing roughly 12-14% of those 
observable and measurable things that determine future performance.  Since we are 
capturing only 12-14% of these factors, there are likely many other factors that we are not 
capturing in our data, or that cannot be observed and measured, that are also predictive of 
future performance.   
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Table 14.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=Ground 
Assignables 
 
Top Third 1.08205 1.21780 
 (0.12532)*** (0.14015)*** 
Bottom Third -1.78946 -1.86477 
 (0.12410)*** (0.13537)*** 
MOS not in top 3 prefs 
rcvd 
0.05905 -0.22509 
 (0.10336) (0.11056)** 
Female officer 1.05375 0.95690 
 (0.17933)*** (0.18705)*** 
Prior Enlisted - from 
ECP,MCP,MECEP 
0.89390 0.83414 
 (0.17205)*** (0.18411)*** 
Age when commissioned -0.04819 -0.04944 
 (0.02264)** (0.02453)** 
Race Black -0.62217 -0.72566 
 (0.21245)*** (0.22170)*** 
Race all others -0.12312 -0.19255 
 (0.29237) (0.30416) 
Married at 1st record 0.80599 0.87413 
 (0.14186)*** (0.15500)*** 
Divorced at 1st record 1.00617 0.84736 
 (0.37484)*** (0.39862)** 
Widowed at 1st record 1.28809 1.07570 
 (3.86875) (3.86047) 
Constant 1.17050 1.49615 
 (0.54411)** (0.59060)** 
Observations 5976 4929 
R-squared 0.12 0.14 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
F(11, 5964) = 72.25 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(11, 4917) = 70.46 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
* significant at 10% 
 
** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
a. Effects of Prior Enlisted Marine 
When estimated in this model, we see that the effect of prior enlisted 
Marine experience is nearly 0.3 points greater than when estimated in Model #2 which 
used TBS performance variables rather than position in the thirds.  These results are 
congruent with the results of the commissioning source variables in the previous model.  
Again, the data suggest that the TBS performance variables are capturing more of the 
prior enlisted Marine effect than the thirds variables are capturing.  This also suggests 
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that prior enlisted Marine experience may be more predictive of an officer’s performance 
in the three areas of evaluation at TBS than it is in predicting where that officer will 
finish in the system of thirds. 
b. Changes in Effects of Other Significant Variables 
The other statistically significant independent variables had little change 
in their coefficients in this model. 
5. Performance Model #5.  Independent Variables:  TBS Final Overall 
Class Ranking, Other-Than-Top-3 MOS Preference, Commissioning 
Sources 
This model examines the effect of the officer’s final overall class ranking.  The 
TBS performance variables and the thirds variables are replaced by the final overall class 
ranking variable.  The results of estimating this multivariate model are depicted in Table 
15.  Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables included in the model specification.  
Column 2 lists the coefficients and standard errors for each of the corresponding 
variables in Column 1.  The data used in estimating the coefficients in Column 2 included 
contract aviators (the unrestricted dataset).  Column 3 lists the coefficients and standard 
errors for each of the corresponding variables in Column 1, and only data on ground 
assignable officers was used in estimating the coefficients in Column 3 (the restricted 
dataset). 
The F-statistics for the unrestricted and restricted versions of Model #5 are 61.17 
and 60.46, respectively, with corresponding P-values of 0.0000 for both.  Therefore, we 
are confident that the model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that the model’s 
results are reliable.  The r-squared values for the unrestricted and restricted models are 
0.13 and 0.16, respectively.  This tells us that we are capturing roughly 13-16% of those 
observable and measurable things that determine future performance.  Since we are 
capturing only 13-16% of these factors, there are likely many other factors that we are not 




Table 15.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=Ground 
Assignables 
 
Overall class rank - 
percent 
0.04416 0.04752 
 (0.00186)*** (0.00201)*** 
MOS not in top 3 prefs 
rcvd 
0.12630 -0.15019 
 (0.10268) (0.10953) 
Female officer 1.02789 0.93464 
 (0.17933)*** (0.18697)*** 
OCC commission 0.24829 0.40498 
 (0.14064)* (0.15624)*** 
NROTC commission 0.47519 0.45954 
 (0.16146)*** (0.17689)*** 
MECEP commission 1.07686 1.14269 
 (0.21576)*** (0.23298)*** 
ECP commission 0.47063 0.50282 
 (0.28413)* (0.29723)* 
USNA commission 0.62108 0.75993 
 (0.17839)*** (0.20058)*** 
MCP commission 1.02525 1.09625 
 (0.38371)*** (0.39847)*** 
Age when commissioned -0.02502 -0.03658 
 (0.02541) (0.02741) 
Race Black -0.51282 -0.61185 
 (0.21146)** (0.22012)*** 
Race all others -0.05046 -0.10935 
 (0.29027) (0.30145) 
Married at 1st record 0.77084 0.84867 
 (0.14151)*** (0.15422)*** 
Divorced at 1st record 0.87075 0.73307 
 (0.37341)** (0.39625)* 
Widowed at 1st record 1.40401 1.22045 
 (3.83532) (3.81798) 
Constant -2.10192 -1.75494 
 (0.60970)*** (0.65820)*** 
Observations 5976 4929 
R-squared 0.13 0.16 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
F(15, 5960) = 61.17 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(15, 4913) = 60.46 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
* significant at 10% 
 




a. Effects of Final Overall Ranking 
The coefficient for final overall ranking in this model is 0.044 in the 
unrestricted model and 0.0475 in the restricted model.  We interpret these coefficients to 
mean that for every 1% increase in final overall ranking an increase in average FITREP 
score of 0.0475 points is predicted, all else held constant, using the coefficient produced 
in the ground assignable model.  To extend the example previously used, if an officer 
were to increase his overall standing by 50% that would predict an increase in average 
FITREP score of 2.375 points. 
This finding is not surprising, as the final lineal standing is a composite of 
the three areas of evaluation (leadership, military skills, academics.)  As we discovered in 
the first model, the leadership coefficients alone were 0.45 and 0.47 for the unrestricted 
and restricted models respectively, which basically mirrors the effect of final overall 
ranking that is demonstrated in this model.  In essence, the effect of the leadership 
ranking is driving the effect of the final overall ranking. 
b. Changes in Effects of Other Significant Variables 
Not surprisingly, the other statistically significant variables in this model 
have coefficients that are very close to the coefficients estimated in the Model #1 that 
included the TBS performance variables instead of the final overall ranking.  There were 
no noteworthy changes in any of these variables. 
6. Performance Model #6.  Independent Variables:  TBS Final Overall 
Class Ranking, Other-Than-Top-3 MOS Preference, Prior Enlisted 
Marine 
In this model, the commissioning source variables are replaced with the prior 
enlisted variable.  The results of estimating this multivariate model are depicted in Table 
16.  Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables included in the model specification.  
Column 2 lists the coefficients and standard errors for each of the corresponding 
variables in Column 1.  The data used in estimating the coefficients in Column 2 included 
contract aviators (the unrestricted dataset).  Column 3 lists the coefficients and standard  
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errors for each of the corresponding variables in Column 1, and only data on ground 
assignable officers was used in estimating the coefficients in Column 3 (the restricted 
dataset). 
The F-statistics for the unrestricted and restricted versions of Model #6 are 89.53 
and 88.15, respectively, with corresponding P-values of 0.0000 for both.  Therefore, we 
are confident that the model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that the model’s 
results are reliable.  The r-squared values for the unrestricted and restricted models are 
0.13 and 0.15, respectively.  This tells us that we are capturing roughly 13-15% of those 
observable and measurable things that determine future performance.  Since we are 
capturing only 13-15% of these factors, there are likely many other factors that we are not 




Table 16.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=Ground 
Assignables 
 
Overall class rank - 
percent 
0.04516 0.04837 
 (0.00183)*** (0.00198)*** 
MOS not in top 3 prefs 
rcvd 
0.11764 -0.16231 
 (0.10275) (0.10967) 
Female officer 1.12279 1.04202 
 (0.17814)*** (0.18552)*** 
Prior Enlisted - from 
ECP,MCP,MECEP 
0.71012 0.65273 
 (0.17137)*** (0.18298)*** 
Age when commissioned -0.04040 -0.04071 
 (0.02249)* (0.02431)* 
Race Black -0.48460 -0.58642 
 (0.21134)** (0.22004)*** 
Race all others -0.07255 -0.12597 
 (0.29023) (0.30139) 
Married at 1st record 0.75895 0.82276 
 (0.14085)*** (0.15363)*** 
Divorced at 1st record 0.89519 0.74475 
 (0.37206)** (0.39495)* 
Widowed at 1st record 1.53469 1.35530 
 (3.84000) (3.82454) 
Constant -1.52589 -1.36708 
 (0.55201)*** (0.59776)** 
Observations 5976 4929 
R-squared 0.13 0.15 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
F(10, 5965) = 89.53 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(10, 4918) = 88.15 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
* significant at 10% 
 
** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
a. Effects of Prior Enlisted Marine 
The coefficient of prior enlisted Marine is statistically significant for both 
the unrestricted and restricted models at the 1% level.  The coefficients for prior enlisted 
Marine in these models are 0.71 and 0.65, respectively.  These coefficients are very close 




b. Changes in Effects of Other Significant Variables 
Not surprisingly, the coefficients for the other statistically significant 
variables in this model are very close to the coefficients for these same variables when 
they were estimated in the previous models.  There are no surprising or large changes in 
these coefficients. 
B. ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE BY GRADE 
The purpose of the secondary model is to evaluate any change in the effects of the 
explanatory variables over time during an officer’s career progression.  To best evaluate 
any changing effects over time of the explanatory variables, these models were estimated 
using only the data for ground assignable officers.  These models are specified exactly as 
Performance model #1, except that a model is estimated with the dependent variable as 
the average cumulative relative value for each of 3 grades, second lieutenant, first 
lieutenant, and captain.  The results of estimating these multivariate models are depicted 
in Table 17. Column 1 is the list of explanatory variables included in the model 
specification.  Column 2 contains the coefficients and standard errors for the second 
lieutenant model.  Column 3 contains the coefficients and standard errors for the first 
lieutenant model, and Column 4 contains the coefficients and standard errors for the 
captain model. 
The F-statistics for the models are 22.78, 36.72, and 5.55, respectively.  The 
corresponding P-values for each model are 0.0000.  Therefore, we are confident that the 
model’s coefficients are jointly significant, and that each model’s results are reliable.  
The r-squared values for the models are 0.10 for the second lieutenant model, 0.15 for the 
first lieutenant model, and 0.08 for the captain model.  We are therefore capturing 10%, 
15% and 8% respectively of those factors or characteristics that predict future 
performance.  There are likely many other factors we have not captured, or are 




Table 17.   Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Average Cumulative Relative Value 
 For Ground Assignables 
 Second 
Lieutenant 
First Lieutenant Captain 
Academics class 
rank - percent 
0.00956 0.00946 0.00525 
 (0.00388)** (0.00326)*** (0.00749) 
Leadership class 
rank - percent 
0.04376 0.04808 0.03560 
 (0.00369)*** (0.00314)*** (0.00692)*** 
Mil Skills class 
rank - percent 
-0.00121 0.00059 0.00760 
 (0.00404) (0.00341) (0.00767) 
MOS not in top 3 
prefs rcvd 
-0.25296 -0.01436 -0.54376 
 (0.19049) (0.15649) (0.34608) 
Female officer 1.01678 1.28454 0.20862 
 (0.29973)*** (0.25322)*** (0.59311) 
OCC commission 0.23232 0.62070 0.35346 
 (0.25459) (0.20791)*** (0.44854) 
NROTC commission 0.43218 0.54522 -0.40734 
 (0.27991) (0.23934)** (0.59889) 
MECEP commission 0.91754 1.21464 1.06917 
 (0.37793)** (0.31146)*** (0.68704) 
ECP commission 0.63407 1.01302 1.33354 
 (0.48095) (0.40257)** (0.82503) 
USNA commission 1.09637 0.51990 -0.06209 
 (0.31722)*** (0.27554)* (0.62850) 
MCP commission 0.49482 0.93493 1.91404 
 (0.62771) (0.52703)* (0.93158)** 
Age at commission 0.09013 -0.10857 -0.20577 
 (0.04492)** (0.03650)*** (0.07768)*** 
Race Black -0.58733 -0.92639 -0.99954 
 (0.35056)* (0.29117)*** (0.62281) 
Race all others -0.25179 -0.41174 1.47583 
 (0.48895) (0.41405) (0.84900)* 
Married 0.65046 1.14646 -0.13932 
 (0.25475)** (0.20893)*** (0.43717) 
Divorced 0.46243 1.21246 -0.25318 
 (0.65299) (0.56741)** (1.24280) 
Widowed 10.03675 -3.15405 0.00000 
 (5.06779)** (4.30587) (0.00000) 
Constant -5.13787 -0.73988 2.66992 
 (1.07970)*** (0.88263) (1.89143) 
Observations 3411 3471 981 




















1. Effects of the TBS Performance Variables 
As the coefficients for academic ranking and military skill ranking show, there is 
little difference in the effect of either of these two variables by grade.  However, when we 
examine the effect of the leadership ranking, we note that the coefficient for the  TBS 
leadership ranking falls from 0.048 for first lieutenants to 0.036 for captains.  This may 
be an indication of a diminishing effect of the TBS leadership ranking over time.  This 
potential diminishing effect may be reflective of the fact that as Marine officers become 
more senior, they are less likely to be in prominent leadership roles, and need to rely less 
heavily on leadership acumen to excel in their jobs.  More senior officers fill more and 
more billets that rely more heavily on administrative, managerial, or technical skill, and 
that require much less supervisory and leadership effort. 
2. Effects of Other Significant Explanatory Variables 
As shown in Table 17, most other explanatory variables do not differ substantially 
by grade, with some exceptions.  For example, the positive effect of a USNA commission 
on FITREP scores appears to diminish as the officer moves from second lieutenant to 
first lieutenant.  The data also suggest that the positive effect of a MCP commission 
becomes stronger over time, and that the officer who is commissioned via MCP performs 
at a higher level as he advances in rank.  Interestingly, age at first commission becomes 
statistically significant in the secondary models.  This variable has a positive effect for 
the second lieutenant model, and then takes on a negative coefficient for the first 
lieutenant and captain models. 
We observe that the coefficient for the variable “black” becomes significant at all 
levels in the first lieutenant model, and increases in magnitude to -0.93 points.  The 
variable for all other races also become significant at the 10% level for the first time in 
the captain model.  This variable has a coefficient of 1.48 in the captain model which 
predicts that an officer who is neither black nor white has FITREP scores that are 1.48 
points higher than others, all other variables held constant. 
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C. ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND RESULTS 
1. Including TBS FY Cohort Dummy Variables  
It may be appropriate to adjust the models specifications by including cohort 
fiscal year dummies in the model specifications.  Each cohort in our dataset is observed 
for a different length of time, they are observed for a different length of time by their 
respective reporting seniors, and they also receive a different number of observed fitness 
reports.  These different cohorts also have different experience levels and different sets of 
experiences. 
We may also wish to account for those officers who voluntarily separate from the 
Marine Corps by including the fiscal year dummies.  Those who voluntarily separate 
from the Marine Corps are, by definition, different from those who stay.  There may be a 
self-selection bias in the performance of those who self-select to leave the Marine Corps. 
Appendix C. contains the model results of each of the original performance 
models, 1-6, with TBS FY cohort dummy variables added.  A comparison of TBS 
performance variables between our original performance models, and these modified 
models reveals that there is virtually no difference in the coefficients of the TBS 
performance variables when TBS FY cohorts are added.  This acts as a test of the 
robustness of our main results, and as the coefficients in both sets of models are basically 
the same we find that our primary performance models are robust to alternative model 
specifications. 
2. Sample Restriction to Those Cohorts Who are Observed Longest 
Another way to deal with the issue of officers being observed for different lengths 
of time in our dataset is to restrict the sample to those cohorts who have been observed 
for roughly an equal length of time and compare the estimated coefficients of that model 
to the estimated coefficients of the primary performance model.  In this case, we chose to 
restrict the sample to TBS FY 99 and TBS FY 00.  These cohorts are roughly equal sized, 
meaning that we are capturing virtually the entire cohort, and they have been observed 
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roughly the entire duration of the dataset (until 2005).  For this model, the primary 
explanatory variable was the overall TBS class ranking percentage.  This was necessary 
because FY 00 does not contain any of the other 3 TBS performance variables. 
In Table 18, the results of Model #5 for both the restricted and unrestricted 
samples are shown next to the results of the modified Model #5, which uses the same 
specification but restricts the sample to TBS FY 99 and TBS FY 00. 
Table 18.   Ordinary Least Squares Results – Model #5 and Modified Models Using Only 
Sample Containing TBS FY99 and TBS FY00 
 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 Sample=99 & 
00 
 Avg Cum Rel Val 
for all reports 
Avg Cum Rel Val 
for all reports 
All PMOS Ground 
Assignables 
TBS rank 0.04416 0.04781 0.04144 0.04344 
 (0.00186)*** (0.00201)*** (0.00259)*** (0.00272)*** 
Non top 3 
MOS 
0.12874 -0.14702 0.61836 0.45924 
 (0.10272) (0.10950) (0.13800)*** (0.14729)*** 
Female 1.02700 0.93697 0.66430 0.71296 
 (0.17934)*** (0.18685)*** (0.26729)** (0.27531)*** 
OCC  0.24800 0.40689 0.20853 0.16923 
 (0.14064)* (0.15613)*** (0.19031) (0.20085) 
NROTC 0.47542 0.46540 0.71915 0.80121 
 (0.16145)*** (0.17661)*** (0.22613)*** (0.23846)*** 
MECEP 1.07747 1.15658 1.43178 1.33126 
 (0.21577)*** (0.23276)*** (0.30456)*** (0.31723)*** 
ECP  0.47133 0.51098 0.52836 0.41789 
 (0.28413)* (0.29690)* (0.38098) (0.38995) 
USNA 0.62189 0.75451 1.00209 1.01733 
 (0.17841)*** (0.20053)*** (0.24725)*** (0.26613)*** 
MCP 1.02697 1.10352 1.49467 1.48017 
 (0.38373)*** (0.39813)*** (0.44606)*** (0.45355)*** 
Age -0.02509 -0.03735 -0.12288 -0.11949 
 (0.02541) (0.02733) (0.03580)*** (0.03704)*** 
Black -0.51367 -0.60613 -0.65730 -0.64535 
 (0.21147)** (0.21997)*** (0.29381)** (0.29945)** 
Other race -0.05129 -0.10607 0.42703 0.42561 
 (0.29028) (0.30126) (0.38672) (0.39815) 
Married 0.77077 0.83511 0.75865 0.81327 
 (0.14151)*** (0.15411)*** (0.18810)*** (0.19815)*** 
Divorced 0.87095 0.72296 0.74901 0.59675 
 (0.37341)** (0.39597)* (0.50144) (0.51171) 
Widowed 1.40570 1.23484 0.00000 0.00000 
 (3.83533) (3.81547) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Constant -2.10124 -1.75057 0.05107 0.03911 




5976 4929 2430 2183 






















A comparison of the coefficients for overall TBS class ranking reveals that the 
results of the modified models that restrict the sample to TBS FY 99 and TBS FY 00 (in 
columns 4 and 5) are numerically and practically very close to those of the primary 
models (in columns 2 and 3).  We conclude that overall TBS class ranking has about the 
same effect in the modified models as in the primary models.  This is another test of the 
robustness of our main results as to the effect of TBS class ranking.  We can, therefore, 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The performance models in Chapter VI were specified to analyze later 
performance of newly commissioned Marine Corps officers, measured by average 
cumulative relative values of fitness reports, as a function of various TBS performance 
variables, demographics, prior enlisted service, MOS assignment, and commissioning 
source.  Table 19 below lists the variables that were statistically significant in the six 
performance models (models 1-6).  For each model, an unrestricted and restricted version 
was estimated.  The unrestricted models were estimated using data from all officers, to 
include contract aviators.  The restricted model omitted contract aviators.  The asterisks 
indicate at what level the variable was significant: *** means that the variable was 
statistically significant at the 1% level for that particular model, ** is significant at the 
.05 level, and * is significant at the .10 level.   
Table 19.   Statistically Significant Predictors of Officer Performance 
Statistically Significant Predictors 
  Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 
Variable U R U R U R U R U R U R 
Academics *** *** *** ***                 
Leadership *** *** *** ***                 
Top Third         *** *** *** ***         
Bottom Third         *** *** *** ***         
Final Ranking                 *** *** *** *** 
MOS Pref   *   *   *   **         
OCC * ***     * ***     * ***     
NROTC ** **     *** ***     *** ***     
MECEP *** ***     *** ***     *** ***     
ECP * **     ** **     * *     
USNA ** ***     *** ***     *** ***     
MCP * *     *** ***     *** ***     
Female *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Prior Enlisted     *** ***     *** ***     *** *** 
Age             ** **     * * 
Black *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** ** *** 
Married *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Divorced *   *   *** ** *** ** ** * ** * 
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A secondary model was also estimated to examine the effects of the explanatory 
variables on average cumulative relative values for different grades.  These models were 
specified so that fitness report scores for second lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains 
were analyzed separately as a function of the explanatory variables, especially TBS 
performance.  Table 20 lists those variables that were statistically significant for the three 
different specifications of this model. 
Table 20.   Statistically Significant Predictors of Performance by Grade. 
Statistically Significant Predictors 
Variable 2ndLt 1stLt Capt 
Academics ** ***   
Leadership *** *** *** 
OCC   ***   
NROTC   **   
MECEP ** ***   
ECP   **   
USNA * ***   
MCP   * ** 
Female *** ***   
Age ** *** *** 
Black * ***   
Married ** ***   
Divorced   **   
 
1. TBS Performance Variables 
Of the three primary TBS performance variables only the leadership ranking and 
academics ranking were statistically significant in models 1 and 2.  Of these, the 
leadership ranking was the most predictive of future performance.  Leadership ranking 
coefficients were 0.045 to 0.047 while the coefficient of the academics ranking was only 
0.01 at its maximum in the restricted models 1 and 2.  We, therefore, conclude that the 
leadership ranking is much more predictive of future performance than the academics 
ranking.   
These findings allow us to draw several conclusions about the evaluation process 
used by The Basic School.  Based on our analysis, performance in the military skills 
events at TBS has no predictive effect on junior officers’ performance.  Also, while the 
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academics ranking was statistically significant, it has little practical significance.  The 
coefficient for this variable is so small that it predicts a very small change in average 
fitness report scores for a large change in academics ranking. 
2. Standing in the System of Thirds 
The variables indicating an officer’s standing in the system of thirds were 
significant at the 1% level in all models.  An officer who finished in the top third of his 
TBS class is predicted to have average fitness report scores that are 1.03 points higher, 
unrestricted model 3 to 1.22 points higher, restricted model 4, than the officer who 
finishes in the middle third, all other variables held constant.  The officer who finishes in 
the bottom third of his TBS class is predicted to have fitness report scores that are 1.76 
points lower, unrestricted model 3 to 1.88 points lower, restricted model 4, than the 
middle third officer, all other variables held constant.  We, therefore, conclude that an 
officer’s performance at TBS, as measured by his standing in the system of thirds, is 
predictive of that officer’s future performance 
3. Final Overall Ranking 
The final overall ranking was statistically significant at the 1% level for all 
models.  This variable’s estimated coefficient was very close in size to the coefficient for 
the leadership ranking in each of the like models.  We conclude that final overall ranking 
is also highly predictive of future performance.  As the final overall ranking is a 
composite of the leadership, academics, and military skills rankings, and leadership 
receives the highest weight, this conclusion is not surprising.  Of note, however, is that 
since this variable’s coefficient was nearly the same as that of the leadership ranking’s 
coefficient for the same models, we can also conclude that the predictive effect of the 





4. MOS Preference Received 
An officer that was assigned an MOS preference that was not in his top 3 MOS 
preferences is predicted to have average fitness report scores that are 0.20 to 0.22 points 
lower than an officer who was assigned a top 3 MOS preference, all other variables held 
constant.  This variable was only found to be statistically significant in the restricted 
models that used only the ground assignable officer population.  The small effect of this 
variable is a surprising finding.  As prior research indicates, those individuals who are 
working in occupations they choose are more likely to enjoy their work and are more 
likely to be higher performing.  The fact that this variable was not statistically significant 
in the unrestricted models (that included all contract aviators) suggests that the 
relationship between TBS performance and future fleet performance that is true of ground 
assignable officers, is not true of contract aviators.  We hypothesize that there is a 
difference between the TBS performance of the ground assignable officers and the TBS 
performance of contract aviators.  Further, we believe that this performance difference is 
the result of the incentive for ground assignable officers to perform well at TBS and the 
lack of incentive for contract aviators to perform well at TBS. 
We also believe that the small effect of being assigned an MOS that is not in the 
top 3 preferences can be accounted for by examining the nature of the officer who is 
likely to become a Marine and by the culture in which those officers work and live.  We 
believe that those who are drawn to the Marine Corps are unlikely to be “quitters” or to 
allow their performance to suffer because they did not get assigned their ideal MOS.  The 
Marine Corps also has a mantra that is repeated wherever one goes in the organization-- 
“bloom where you are planted.”  This attitude is prevalent in the Marine Corps, and as 
Marines are likely to do several tours of duty in jobs that are not directly related to their 
primary MOS, it is also a necessary attitude. 
It is our conclusion that the MOS assignment process, the nature of Marine 
officers, and the Marine culture all work together to mitigate any performance 
disincentive that may exist from being assigned a low MOS preference. 
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5. Commissioning Sources 
Commissioning source variables were all statistically significant at various levels 
in all models.  Generally, commissioning source variables carried higher levels of 
statistical significance in the restricted models than in the unrestricted models.  We 
conclude that an officer’s commissioning source is predictive of future performance.  
Specifically, officers from enlisted-to-officer programs perform better than those from 
other programs.  Commissioning sources that are indicative of some type of military 
acculturation are also more highly predictive of future performance than those that are 
associated with little to no military acculturation. 
We also conclude that the effect of commissioning sources on future performance 
is masked in those models that include contract aviators.  We make this conclusion based 
on the fact that in five instances, commissioning source variables became more highly 
significant in the restricted model, and in no case is the statistical significance of a 
commissioning source variable stronger in the unrestricted model than the restricted 
model.  This again suggests that there is a performance difference between ground 
assignable officers and contract aviators. 
6. Prior Enlisted Marine 
Prior enlisted Marine service was statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
models.  All other variables equal, prior enlisted Marine service predicts higher fitness 
report scores of 0.54 to 0.89 points.  We conclude that Marine officers who are 
commissioned via the Marine Corps’ enlisted-to-officer commissioning sources have 
better performance in the operating forces than those officers who do not have prior 
enlisted Marine service, all else equal.  We also conclude that this effect is relatively 
small and has little practical significance given its magnitude. 
7. Gender 
The coefficient for the variable “female” was statistically significant to the 1% 
level in every model.  We, therefore, conclude that there is a difference in fitness report 
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scores between males and females.  Our analysis predicted that an officer who has all the 
attributes of the reference group, but is female, has fitness report scores that are 1.3 to 
0.84 points higher than a male.  This finding has practical significance as well, as the 
magnitude of the effect is rather large.  An analysis of what factors account for this 
difference in fitness report scores is beyond the scope of this study.  Hence, we cannot 
determine if this is due to a difference in actual performance or characteristics unique to 
females of the reference group. 
8. Race 
The coefficient for the variable “black” was statistically significant at the 1% 
level in every model excepting two models in which it was statistically significant at the 
5% level.  We, therefore, conclude that there is a difference in fitness report scores 
between whites and blacks.  Our analysis predicted that an officer that has all the 
attributes of the reference group, but is black, has fitness report scores that are 0.48 points 
lower in unrestricted model 6, to 0.78 points lower in restricted model 1 than a white 
member of the reference group.  We conclude that at the upper end of this range this 
difference is practically significant due to its magnitude.  An analysis of what factors 
account for this difference in fitness report scores is beyond the scope of this study.  
Hence, we cannot determine if this is due to a difference in actual performance or 
performance characteristics unique to black officers of the reference group.   
9. Marital Status 
We conclude that the marital status of an officer is predictive of future 
performance.  The “married” variable was statistically significant at the 1% level in every 
model, and the “divorced” variable was statistically significant in every model except 
two.  The coefficients for these variables were, in every case, positive.  We, therefore, 
also conclude that married or divorced officers who have all the other attributes of our 
reference group will be higher performers than the reference group.  We believe that the 
practical significance of this finding is that maturity plays a role in the effectiveness of an  
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officer.  We make this assertion based on the intuition that an officer who is married, or 
has been through a marriage and is now divorced, has greater experience, maturity, and 
skill in managing interpersonal conflict. 
10. Effects by Grade 
Based on our separate analysis of fitness report scores for second lieutenants, first 
lieutenants, and captains, we conclude that the predictive nature of the leadership ranking 
at TBS is an enduring effect, as noted by the coefficients of the leadership ranking 
variable in our three models.  The captain model has a relatively small number of 
observations (981), and though the leadership ranking variable is statistically significant 
at the 1% level in this model, we believe that further analysis of TBS performance as a 
predictor of future performance should be conducted for more senior officers, using more 
observations. 
B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is the relationship between the weighted/graded areas at The 
Basic School (Leadership, Academics, Military Skills) and 
performance in the operating forces as measured by fitness report 
scores? 
 
The results of this thesis indicate that of the three weighted/graded areas of 
evaluation at TBS, only one is a significant predictor of future performance.  The 
leadership ranking is the best predictor of future performance, among the three areas of 
evaluation.  Specifically, an officer who increases his leadership ranking by 1% is 
predicted to have average fitness report scores that are 0.045 points higher, according to 
restricted model 1, all other variables held constant.  This improvement in fitness report 
scores becomes substantial when we compare officers who are identical in every way 
with the exception of their respective leadership rankings.  Of these two officers, the 
officer who has a leadership ranking that is 50% higher than the other is predicted to have 
fitness report scores that are 2.25 points higher than the other.  The practical significance 
of this finding is that higher fitness report scores are indicative of higher performing 
officers, and are also predictive of future promotions. 
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 The academic ranking was found to be statistically significant, but of little 
practical significance due to the magnitude of the coefficient for this variable, which was, 
at its maximum, 0.01.  According to restricted model 1, an officer who increases his 
academic ranking by 1% is predicted to have average fitness report scores that are .01 
points higher, all other variables held constant.   To extend the above example, two 
officers who are identical in every respect, but have academics rankings that are 50% 
different, are predicted to have a difference in average fitness report scores of 0.5 points.  
The military skills ranking was not found to be statistically significant in any model, and 
is therefore considered to have no predictive effect on future performance. 
2. What is the relationship between the student's final lineal standing at 
TBS and performance in the operating forces?  
Our analysis of final overall ranking reveals that the predictive effect of the final 
overall TBS ranking on future performance is virtually the same as the predictive effect 
of the leadership ranking by itself.  This finding is not surprising given that the final 
overall ranking is a composite of the leadership, academics, and military skills rankings.  
An officer who improves his final overall ranking by 1% is predicted to have average 
fitness report scores that are 0.044 to 0.048 points higher, all other variables held 
constant. 
3. Are individuals with certain background characteristics more 
successful in the operating forces?  
Our thesis analyzed the effects of basic demographics and commissioning 
sources.  Of these, several variables were found to be statistically significant predictors of 
future performance.  Of the demographic characteristics, gender and race were highly 
predictive of junior officer performance.  All else equal, a female officer is predicted to 
have higher average fitness report scores and a black officer is predicted to have lower 
average fitness report scores. 
Of the commissioning source variables, all commissioning programs were found 




commissioning source effects, the greatest effects were found in the Marine Corp’ 
enlisted-to-officer programs which predicted the greatest increase in average fitness 
report scores. 
4. Is the quality spread the most effective tool for assigning MOSs from 
The Basic School? 
The results of our analysis cannot answer this question as it is posed.  Rather, we 
can state that the quality spread does ensure that higher, lower, and average performing 
officers are distributed somewhat equitably across all ground assignable MOSs due to the 
quality spread.  We cannot determine based on this analysis whether the quality spread is 
the most effective system used to assign an MOS.  Our models showed that there are 
performance differences between officers who finish TBS in different thirds.  Notably, 
top third officers of the reference group are predicted to have fitness report scores that are 
1.03 points higher, unrestricted model 3 to 1.22 points higher, restricted model 4, than 
middle third officers of the reference group, all else held constant.  Also, bottom third 
officers of the reference group are predicted to have fitness report scores that are 1.76 
points lower, unrestricted model 3 to 1.86 points lower, restricted model, than the middle 
third officers of the reference group.  This means, according to unrestricted model 3 and 
restricted model 4 that there is a predicted 2.79 to 3.09 point difference in fitness report 
scores between bottom third officers and top third officers of the reference group. 
We can therefore state that due to the manner in which MOSs are assigned to 
students as outlined in Chapter II, a relatively equal proportion of high, average, and low 
performing officers are being distributed amongst the ground assignable MOSs.  We can 
also state that the quality spread is doing what it is intended to do by distributing 




5. Is the Staff Platoon Commander doing an adequate job of evaluating 
student officers? 
Again, our analysis cannot answer this question as it is written.  However, we 
have determined that leadership ranking is the most predictive TBS performance variable 
of future performance.  As the SPC assigns 90% of the leadership grade by virtue of 
ranking his students for each leadership evaluation, we conclude that the SPC is 
evaluating students according to the traits and characteristics that predict actual 
performance in the operating forces. 
What our analysis cannot determine is how well the SPC is making this 
evaluation because we have no baseline from which to draw conclusions about how well 
the SPC makes his evaluations.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Weight the leadership evaluation ranking at TBS more heavily and 
reduce the weighting of academics and military skills rankings in the 
TBS student evaluation process. 
The rationale behind this recommendation is rooted in the Marine Corps’ policy 
of promoting the best and most fully qualified officers, as highlighted in Chapter II.  
Officers are ranked lineally, by date of commission, in the Blue Book by final overall 
TBS ranking.  The current weighting of academics, leadership, and military skills dictates 
that academics and military skills account for 64% of this final ranking, while leadership 
accounts for only 36% of the final ranking.  Our analysis demonstrates that academics 
and military skills actually predict very little of future performance.  We, therefore, 
recommend that the leadership ranking be weighted more heavily in the performance 
evaluation at TBS.  This assures that the factor that is most predictive of fleet 
performance of junior officers plays a larger part in establishing the final lineal ranking 




Our recommendation is that TBS adopt a weighting distribution that is structured 
as follows: 
 Leadership  50% 
  First Leadership Evaluation  25% 
  Second Leadership Evaluation 25% 
 Academics  25% 
 Military Skills  25% 
 
Table 21 provides an example of how lineal rankings in a TBS company would 
change with this new weighting policy.  Note that these observations are taken generally 
from the middle of the company lineal standing, and that the “# Change” column 
indicates the number of lineal places that the officer’s standing has changed (up (+) or 
down (-)), from the present weighting system to the proposed weighting system. 











109 88.3542 A 87.91893 106 +3 
110 88.3351 B 87.7711 108 +2 
111 88.3112 C 87.39268 119 -8 
112 88.1698 D 86.7462 130 -18 
113 88.115 E 87.9717 103 +10 
114 88.0773 F 87.68158 111 +3 
115 88.0346 G 86.64618 133 -18 
116 87.926 H 87.16555 123 -7 
117 87.9069 I 87.58543 113 +4 
118 87.8505 J 86.61735 134 -16 
119 87.8447 K 87.5975 112 +7 
120 87.8302 L 86.5363 136 -16 
121 87.7393 M 87.7635 109 +12 
122 87.7144 N 86.66353 132 -10 
123 87.6833 O 85.87955 151 -28 
124 87.6071 P 87.57153 114 +10 
125 87.6013 Q 86.84053 126 -1 
126 87.5764 R 86.17828 143 -17 
127 87.5562 S 86.96845 125 +2 
128 87.5442 T 87.88263 107 +21 
129 87.5165 U 87.00163 124 +5 
130 87.5127 V 87.5392 116 +14 
131 87.4991 W 86.78378 129 +2 
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132 87.437 X 85.8713 152 -20 
133 87.3779 Y 86.05098 148 -15 
134 87.3099 Z 87.2751 121 +13 
135 87.3083 AA 86.28013 140 -5 
136 87.3071 BB 86.57228 135 +1 
137 87.2932 CC 86.0122 149 -12 
138 87.2815 DD 87.50903 117 +21 
139 87.2366 EE 86.46568 138 +1 
140 87.1756 FF 85.60865 157 -17 
141 87.0953 GG 88.40195 95 +46 
142 87.0148 HH 86.74368 131 +11 
143 86.9099 II 86.21308 142 +1 
144 86.9087 JJ 85.17268 170 -26 
145 86.9047 KK 86.26298 141 +4 
146 86.8994 LL 85.5705 158 -12 
147 86.7059 MM 85.3089 165 -18 
148 86.6713 NN 86.49483 137 +11 
149 86.6226 OO 85.88953 150 -1 
  
Table 21 shows that the largest changes in ranking are for the officers who have 
high leadership scores but relatively low academics and military skills scores, or vice 
versa.  For example, officer GG improved his lineal standing by 46 places.  Further 
examination of this officer’s TBS performance reveals that, under the present weighting 
system, he was ranked 229th in academics, 26th in leadership, and 213th in military skills, 
resulting in an overall ranking of 141.  However, when the proposed weighting system is 
applied, his overall ranking improves to 95 on the strength of his leadership performance 
(+46). 
2. Retain the quality spread for MOS assignment 
The results of our analysis have shown that the quality spread does what it is 
intended to do by distributing high, average, and low performing officers to each of the 
ground assignable MOSs.  We recommend that the Marine Corps continue to use the 
quality spread as the basis for MOS assignment at TBS as long as the Marine Corps 




3. Ensure that each officer’s top 10 MOS preferences are maintained by 
CNA 
The dataset obtained from CNA contains only the top 3 MOS preferences for each 
officer.  This does not allow for an analysis of performance as a function of MOS 
preference assigned outside of those top 3 MOSs.  TBS states its MOS assignment goals 
are oriented toward placing officers in a top 5 MOS preference, so can should warehouse 
information on each officer’s top 5 MOS preferences at a minimum.  We recommend, 
however, that CNA be provided with, and maintain, the top 10 MOS preferences for each 
officer.  This recommendation is made so that future analysis can determine at what 
point, if any, does performance begin to degrade due to an officer being assigned a low 
MOS choice. 
4. Standardize MOS preference submission for contract aviators as part 
of the MOS assignment process 
The CNA dataset includes the top 3 MOS preferences for each officer;  however, 
the MOS preferences for contract aviators are not standardized.  Many observations on 
contract aviators have MOS preferences for aviation listed, while others have all ground 
assignable MOSs listed.  This creates several problems.  The first is that several officers 
from each company compete for and are assigned aviation MOSs.  These officers are not 
“contract” aviators, but are assigned aviation MOSs.  In this analysis, we determined that 
the best method to resolve this issue was to code the data so that each aviation officer was 
noted to have been assigned his first choice of MOS.  We recommend that TBS adopt a 
policy that all contract aviators list only ground assignable MOSs in their preference lists, 
and that only those ground assignable officers who are qualified and desire to be aviators 
or Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) list aviation MOSs as their first choice, or first and 
second choice for those who desire either “pilot” or “NFO.”  This ensures that an aviator 




5. Create “Prior enlisted” and “Prior enlisted Marine” variables that 
will be warehoused in the Total Force Data Warehouse, or as part of 
the TBS performance data maintained by CNA 
We recommend that prior enlisted officers have a variable attached to their 
electronic record in TFDW that identifies them as prior enlisted officers.  We further 
recommend that this variable be a categorical variable so as to allow for a designation of 
what service the officer served as an enlisted member.  In the TFDW data we were able 
to determine, for the most part, which officers were prior enlisted by analyzing Pay Entry 
Base Date or Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date.  We had no means to identify which 
of these were prior enlisted Marines and which were from other services.  This data was 
also contradictory in many cases.  The CNA data had a commissioning source variable 
from which we constructed a prior enlisted variable.  We determined that the most 
reliable method was to use the Marine Corps officer-to-enlisted commissioning sources 
as the identifier for prior enlisted Marine service.  We could not capture any officer who 
was a prior enlisted Marine, but did not get commissioned via the Marine Corps’ 
enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs. 
6. Administer exit survey questions to determine the effect of MOS 
preference assigned on the separation decisions of voluntarily 
separating company grade officers 
Our analysis demonstrated that the MOS preference an officer is assigned while a 
student at TBS has little effect on that officer’s future performance.  What we cannot 
determine, however, is what effect the MOS assigned may have on the retention 
decisions made by individuals.  We recommend that voluntarily separating company 
grade officers be asked, using an exit survey, what impact the MOS they were assigned 
has on their decisions to voluntarily leave the Marine Corps.  This is especially important 
now as the Marine Corps has been tasked to grow in end strength. 
7. Continue assigning officers to their highest MOS preferences 
Though our analysis demonstrated that MOS preference has little practical effect 
on future performance, we believe that the Marine Corps must continue to strive to assign 
officers to the highest MOS preferences possible.  We believe there will be positive 
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retention effects from assigning officers to high MOS preferences.  We also believe that 
the knowledge that every officer will have a fair chance of being assigned their MOS of 
preference is beneficial to recruiting, and that potential officer candidates would be less 
inclined to serve in the Marine Corps if they believed that the organization did not 
attempt to assign all officers to MOSs based on a policy of highest preference possible, or 
best suitability. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Conduct an analysis of officer performance by MOS to determine the 
overall effectiveness of the quality spread.  Based on this analysis, 
determine if the Marine Corps should modify the quality spread in 
order to better distribute performance across the MOSs 
The results of our analysis allowed us to determine that the quality spread does 
what it is intended to do.  The quality spread ensures that a relatively equal distribution of 
higher performing, lower performing, and average performing officers are allocated to 
each of the ground assignable MOSs.  The results of our analysis cannot be applied to an 
individual MOS, as we did not evaluate any individual MOSs.  Hence, our analysis 
cannot determine how well performance is distributed by individual MOSs.  An analysis 
of the distribution of MOS preference assigned to each MOS, as well as an analysis of the 
average cumulative relative values of the fitness reports for those officers assigned to 
each MOS would allow for a determination of how well the quality spread actually 
distributes performance across the MOSs.  Based on the results of this analysis, a 
determination can be made as to whether the Marine Corps should modify the quality 
spread and adopt a system of sixths to replace the present system of thirds. 
There are traditionally unpopular MOSs that are more likely to be found lower on 
the preference lists of ground assignable officers.  Ground Supply (MOS 3002) and 
Adjutant (MOS 0180) are traditionally two unpopular MOSs.  Figure 7.1 below 
demonstrates the effect of adopting a system of sixths instead of the present system of 
thirds.  In this example, Ground Supply is given 6 total Ground Supply allocations to fill.  
Because this MOS is traditionally lower on the MOS preference lists, normally officers 
who are lower in their respective thirds are assigned to this MOS.  In the system of sixths, 
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an unpopular MOS may still receive officers who are lower in their respective sixths, but 
several of those officers will be lineally higher than they would otherwise have been in 
the system of thirds. 
3002 Allocations 
   
Present  Proposed 
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2  1 
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Figure 4.   Hypothetical distribution of MOSs in the proposed system of sixths 
 
2. Conduct an analysis of performance differences between contract 
aviators and ground assignable officers at TBS 
Several of the results of our analysis suggest that there is a difference in the 
performance of contract aviators and ground assignable officers.  Our analysis, however, 
did not attempt to determine if there is a performance difference at TBS between these 
two groups.  There is also a long-standing preconception amongst the faculty and 
students at TBS that many contract aviators do not fully immerse themselves in their 
education at The Basic School because contract aviators do not compete for an MOS 
assignment.  By determining if there is a performance difference between contract 
aviators and ground assignable officers, the Marine Corps could determine if there needs 
to be a policy change to ensure that every officer has an equal incentive to perform to the 
best of their ability at TBS. 
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3. Analysis of FITREP score differences between male and female 
officers 
As our analysis has shown, there is a difference in fitness report scores between 
males and females.  We believe an analysis should be conducted to determine why this 
difference exists and to allow the Marine Corps to consider if policy changes are 
necessary based on the results of the analysis. 
4. Analysis of FITREP score differences between black officers and non-
black officers 
As our analysis has shown, there is a difference in fitness report scores between a 
whites and blacks.  Our analysis did not attempt to determine what factors account for 
this difference in fitness report scores.  We believe an analysis should be conducted to 
determine why this difference exists and to allow the Marine Corps to consider if policy 
changes are necessary based on the results of the analysis. 
5. TBS performance as a predictor of future performance over time. 
The Marine Corps’ present Performance Evaluation System instituted numerical 
scales for evaluations, replacing a system in which the greatest weight was given to those 
reports that were well written.  This analysis used the new fitness report data from the 
date the new system was first implemented until the end of FY 2005.  Our analysis does 
not attempt to evaluate TBS performance as a predictor of future performance for officers 
past the rank of captain.  Moreover, most of the captains in the data set are very junior.  
We believe that it would be worthwhile to analyze the fitness report scores of more senior 
officers as a function of TBS performance.  This would allow the Marine Corps to 
determine how long-lasting the predictive effects of TBS performance are for officers as 
they become further removed from their education at TBS.  For example, fitness report 
data can be obtained from the implementation point of the new PES (1999) up to the 
present (2008).  That data could then be collapsed by id and rank, giving dependent 
variables by rank.  Models similar to ours could then be estimated using TBS 
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APPENDIX C.  MODIFIED MODEL RESULTS 
 Model #1 Model #1 Modified Model 1 Modified Model 1 
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 
All PMOS 
Sample=99 & 00 
GA 
Acad rank% 0.00776 0.01014 0.00763 0.01005 
 (0.00252)*** (0.00273)*** (0.00252)*** (0.00272)*** 
Ldrshp rank% 0.04544 0.04721 0.04570 0.04753 
 (0.00239)*** (0.00260)*** (0.00239)*** (0.00260)*** 
Milskil Rank% -0.00012 -0.00028 -0.00019 -0.00031 
 (0.00262) (0.00286) (0.00262) (0.00285) 
Non top 3 MOS -0.07889 -0.22319 -0.06141 -0.22338 
 (0.12689) (0.13175)* (0.12693) (0.13182)* 
Female 1.24994 1.17002 1.24718 1.17931 
 (0.20288)*** (0.21007)*** (0.20294)*** (0.20990)*** 
OCC 0.29759 0.51906 0.30324 0.51162 
 (0.15969)* (0.17646)*** (0.16187)* (0.17965)*** 
NROTC 0.42165 0.39534 0.42269 0.39419 
 (0.18365)** (0.19964)** (0.18396)** (0.19990)** 
MECEP 0.85537 1.03238 0.88042 1.05361 
 (0.24385)*** (0.26172)*** (0.24383)*** (0.26175)*** 
ECP  0.57056 0.73591 0.60245 0.75273 
 (0.32472)* (0.33828)** (0.32495)* (0.33851)** 
USNA 0.52298 0.67385 0.54117 0.70367 
 (0.20323)** (0.22584)*** (0.20353)*** (0.22616)*** 
MCP  0.74733 0.85646 0.77828 0.81174 
 (0.43663)* (0.45156)* (0.43864)* (0.45411)* 
Age  -0.01857 -0.03330 -0.02445 -0.03782 
 (0.02861) (0.03070) (0.02868) (0.03074) 
Black -0.66514 -0.78005 -0.64349 -0.76278 
 (0.23719)*** (0.24596)*** (0.23700)*** (0.24559)*** 
Other race 0.04979 0.02236 0.10345 0.08161 
 (0.33052) (0.34019) (0.33045) (0.33990) 
Married 0.81581 0.87201 0.81490 0.87377 
 (0.16240)*** (0.17537)*** (0.16221)*** (0.17508)*** 
Divorced 0.81495 0.69361 0.83647 0.73987 
 (0.43337)* (0.46208) (0.43315)* (0.46166) 
Widowed 1.28763 1.17487   
 (3.87895) (3.85326)   
TBS FY 98   -0.69768 -0.44125 
   (1.12681) (1.16897) 
TBS FY 99   -0.31524 -0.23229 
   (0.16544)* (0.18349) 
TBS FY 00   0.00000 0.00000 
   (0.00000) (0.00000) 
TBS FY 01   -0.06322 -0.19362 
   (0.16451) (0.18106) 
TBS FY 03   -0.16949 -0.19514 
   (0.18142) (0.19432) 
TBS FY 04   -0.89105 -1.06329 
   (0.23003)*** (0.23838)*** 
TBS FY 05   -0.21254 -0.79871 
   (0.61043) (0.75190) 
Constant -2.70205 -2.46893 -2.37168 -2.12556 
 (0.68893)*** (0.73991)*** (0.70862)*** (0.76083)*** 
Observations 4757 3957 4757 3957 





















 Model #2 Model #2 Modified Model 2 Modified Model 2
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 
All PMOS 
Sample=99 & 00 
GA 
Acad rank% 0.00815 0.01047 0.00802 0.01038 
 (0.00251)*** (0.00272)*** (0.00251)*** (0.00272)*** 
Ldrshp rank% 0.04555 0.04707 0.04581 0.04741 
 (0.00238)*** (0.00260)*** (0.00238)*** (0.00259)*** 
Milskil 
rank% 
0.00014 -0.00008 0.00006 -0.00009 
 (0.00262) (0.00285) (0.00262) (0.00285) 
Non top 3 
MOS 
-0.08767 -0.23675 -0.07141 -0.24081 
 (0.12688) (0.13176)* (0.12693) (0.13181)* 
Female 1.32633 1.25367 1.32495 1.26627 
 (0.20123)*** (0.20819)*** (0.20134)*** (0.20806)*** 
Pri Enl Mar 0.54973 0.56859 0.57578 0.58914 
 (0.19544)*** (0.20796)*** (0.19548)*** (0.20792)*** 
Age -0.02302 -0.02172 -0.02961 -0.02907 
 (0.02523) (0.02718) (0.02533) (0.02727) 
Black -0.65832 -0.78439 -0.63790 -0.77014 
 (0.23689)*** (0.24576)*** (0.23669)*** (0.24537)*** 
Other race 0.03761 0.01794 0.08875 0.07052 
 (0.33041) (0.34012) (0.33037) (0.33986) 
Married 0.78560 0.82171 0.78364 0.82260 
 (0.16138)*** (0.17440)*** (0.16120)*** (0.17412)*** 
Divorced 0.80336 0.67156 0.82073 0.71530 
 (0.43157)* (0.46037) (0.43133)* (0.45994) 
Widowed 1.38199 1.27855   
 (3.88095) (3.85776)   
TBS FY 98   -0.68271 -0.42987 
   (1.12727) (1.17027) 
TBS FY 99   -0.32678 -0.22973 
   (0.16477)** (0.18263) 
TBS FY 00   0.00000 0.00000 
   (0.00000) (0.00000) 
TBS FY 01   -0.07239 -0.20200 
   (0.16425) (0.18075) 
TBS FY 03   -0.22864 -0.28697 
   (0.18016) (0.19258) 
TBS FY 04   -0.88804 -1.06464 
   (0.22999)*** (0.23843)*** 
TBS FY 05   -0.26053 -0.80000 
   (0.60977) (0.75208) 
Constant -2.38056 -2.41658 -2.01167 -1.98442 
 (0.62505)*** (0.67354)*** (0.64451)*** (0.69468)*** 
Observations 4757 3957 4757 3957 






















 Model #3 Model #3 Modified Model 3Modified Model 3
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 
All PMOS 
Sample=99 & 00 
GA 
Top Third 1.03089 1.17918 1.03230 1.17624 
 (0.12577)*** (0.14044)*** (0.12569)*** (0.14007)*** 
Bottom Third -1.76535 -1.86051 -1.76423 -1.86416 
 (0.12424)*** (0.13546)*** (0.12417)*** (0.13512)*** 
Non top3 MOS 0.07103 -0.20871 0.03305 -0.45292 
 (0.10328) (0.11035)* (0.11429) (0.12971)*** 
Female 0.94843 0.84139 0.94624 0.85928 
 (0.18041)*** (0.18824)*** (0.18053)*** (0.18791)*** 
OCC 0.25659 0.42092 0.26598 0.40102 
 (0.14169)* (0.15761)*** (0.14322)* (0.15966)** 
NROTC 0.53681 0.53675 0.53626 0.52219 
 (0.16254)*** (0.17814)*** (0.16277)*** (0.17813)*** 
MECEP 1.30105 1.38225 1.32210 1.38527 
 (0.21675)*** (0.23434)*** (0.21672)*** (0.23409)*** 
ECP 0.58335 0.63257 0.60499 0.60949 
 (0.28606)** (0.29948)** (0.28625)** (0.29940)** 
USNA 0.69162 0.83487 0.70240 0.84610 
 (0.17960)*** (0.20220)*** (0.17987)*** (0.20220)*** 
MCP 1.22290 1.29948 1.25600 1.22133 
 (0.38595)*** (0.40120)*** (0.38737)*** (0.40266)*** 
Age -0.02859 -0.04176 -0.03278 -0.04308 
 (0.02559) (0.02758) (0.02566) (0.02758) 
Black -0.65029 -0.74470 -0.62455 -0.70903 
 (0.21245)*** (0.22149)*** (0.21239)*** (0.22100)*** 
Other race -0.09482 -0.16371 -0.05236 -0.10881 
 (0.29230) (0.30389) (0.29224) (0.30328) 
Married 0.81578 0.88763 0.81488 0.88780 
 (0.14246)*** (0.15541)*** (0.14233)*** (0.15501)*** 
Divorced 0.97101 0.81807 0.97859 0.80094 
 (0.37605)*** (0.39946)** (0.37598)*** (0.39889)** 
Widowed 1.15430 0.95048   
 (3.86232) (3.84943)   
TBS FY 98   -0.93124 -0.55234 
   (1.12098) (1.16587) 
TBS FY 99   -0.34502 -0.22665 
   (0.16457)** (0.18290) 
TBS FY 00   -0.05504 0.33905 
   (0.17412) (0.19986)* 
TBS FY 01   -0.04334 -0.13936 
   (0.16380) (0.18065) 
TBS FY 03   -0.12265 -0.20280 
   (0.18026) (0.19337) 
TBS FY 04   -0.85054 -1.05882 
   (0.22889)*** (0.23782)*** 
TBS FY 05   -0.31593 -1.01500 
   (0.60801) (0.75069) 
Constant 0.42732 0.96256 0.70268 1.24026 
 (0.60956) (0.65826) (0.62926) (0.67814)* 
Observations 5976 4929 5976 4929 




















 Model #4 Model #4 Modified Model 4Modified Model 4
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 
All PMOS 
Sample=99 & 00 
GA 
Top Third 1.08193 1.22508 1.08367 1.22341 
 (0.12532)*** (0.14003)*** (0.12524)*** (0.13967)*** 
Bottom Third -1.78932 -1.87680 -1.78660 -1.88059 
 (0.12410)*** (0.13526)*** (0.12403)*** (0.13494)*** 
Non top 3 MOS 0.05823 -0.22490 0.01549 -0.47593 
 (0.10338) (0.11051)** (0.11438) (0.12986)*** 
Female  1.05351 0.96040 1.05166 0.97772 
 (0.17934)*** (0.18695)*** (0.17947)*** (0.18663)*** 
Pri Enl Marin 0.89430 0.84324 0.91299 0.84574 
 (0.17206)*** (0.18397)*** (0.17208)*** (0.18372)*** 
Age -0.04822 -0.04991 -0.05252 -0.05403 
 (0.02264)** (0.02448)** (0.02272)** (0.02452)** 
Race -0.62234 -0.71970 -0.59699 -0.68546 
 (0.21246)*** (0.22157)*** (0.21239)*** (0.22106)*** 
Race -0.12342 -0.18816 -0.08179 -0.13748 
 (0.29238) (0.30397) (0.29234) (0.30340) 
Married 0.80597 0.86276 0.80428 0.86377 
 (0.14186)*** (0.15490)*** (0.14173)*** (0.15449)*** 
Divorced 1.00611 0.83920 1.01009 0.82503 
 (0.37484)*** (0.39835)** (0.37473)*** (0.39771)** 
Widowed 1.28784 1.08769   
 (3.86875) (3.85802)   
TBS FY 98   -0.92533 -0.55401 
   (1.12280) (1.16841) 
TBS FY 99   -0.37213 -0.24876 
   (0.16423)** (0.18246) 
TBS FY 00   -0.07138 0.31561 
   (0.17425) (0.20010) 
TBS FY 01   -0.06897 -0.17428 
   (0.16380) (0.18064) 
TBS FY 03   -0.19668 -0.30285 
   (0.17949) (0.19224) 
TBS FY 04   -0.85193 -1.06587 
   (0.22916)*** (0.23817)*** 
TBS FY 05   -0.35882 -1.00701 
   (0.60827) (0.75179) 
Constant 1.17153 1.51063 1.48051 1.88267 
 (0.54406)** (0.58966)** (0.56387)*** (0.61022)*** 
Observations 5976 4929 5976 4929 
























 Model #5 Model #5 Modified Model 5 Modified Model 5
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 
All PMOS 
Sample=99 & 00 
GA 
TBS classrank 0.04416 0.04781 0.04414 0.04771 
 (0.00186)*** (0.00201)*** (0.00186)*** (0.00200)*** 
Non top 3 MOS 0.12874 -0.14702 0.10411 -0.37094 
 (0.10272) (0.10950) (0.11372) (0.12880)*** 
Female  1.02700 0.93697 1.02372 0.95245 
 (0.17934)*** (0.18685)*** (0.17946)*** (0.18657)*** 
OCC  0.24800 0.40689 0.25630 0.38567 
 (0.14064)* (0.15613)*** (0.14217)* (0.15821)** 
NROTC 0.47542 0.46540 0.47553 0.45324 
 (0.16145)*** (0.17661)*** (0.16168)*** (0.17664)** 
MECEP 1.07747 1.15658 1.09796 1.16068 
 (0.21577)*** (0.23276)*** (0.21576)*** (0.23257)*** 
ECP  0.47133 0.51098 0.49462 0.49059 
 (0.28413)* (0.29690)* (0.28432)* (0.29688)* 
USNA 0.62189 0.75451 0.63255 0.76564 
 (0.17841)*** (0.20053)*** (0.17868)*** (0.20057)*** 
MCP  1.02697 1.10352 1.05891 1.02890 
 (0.38373)*** (0.39813)*** (0.38516)*** (0.39968)** 
Age -0.02509 -0.03735 -0.02953 -0.03881 
 (0.02541) (0.02733) (0.02548) (0.02734) 
Race -0.51367 -0.60613 -0.49007 -0.57509 
 (0.21147)** (0.21997)*** (0.21141)** (0.21952)*** 
Other race -0.05129 -0.10607 -0.01062 -0.05441 
 (0.29028) (0.30126) (0.29023) (0.30073) 
Married 0.77077 0.83511 0.77059 0.83630 
 (0.14151)*** (0.15411)*** (0.14138)*** (0.15375)*** 
Divorced 0.87095 0.72296 0.87987 0.70764 
 (0.37341)** (0.39597)* (0.37336)** (0.39549)* 
Widowed 1.40570 1.23484   
 (3.83533) (3.81547)   
TBS FY 98   -1.15018 -0.75060 
   (1.11315) (1.15576) 
TBS FY 99   -0.34283 -0.21738 
   (0.16342)** (0.18133) 
TBS FY 00   -0.09720 0.29361 
   (0.17295) (0.19819) 
TBS FY 01   -0.05331 -0.13754 
   (0.16266) (0.17910) 
TBS FY 03   -0.14471 -0.21010 
   (0.17898) (0.19171) 
TBS FY 04   -0.84772 -1.04269 
   (0.22730)*** (0.23575)*** 
TBS FY 05   -0.23633 -0.87048 
   (0.60365) (0.74408) 
Constant -2.10124 -1.75057 -1.80979 -1.46990 
 (0.60966)*** (0.65667)*** (0.62902)*** (0.67639)** 
Observations 5976 4929 5976 4929 






















 Model #6 Model #6 Modified Model 6 Modified Model 6
 Sample=All PMOS Sample=GA Sample=99 & 00 
All PMOS 
Sample=99 & 00 
GA 
TBS classrank 0.04516 0.04864 0.04513 0.04857 
 (0.00183)*** (0.00198)*** (0.00183)*** (0.00198)*** 
Non top 3 MOS 0.11911 -0.15997 0.09040 -0.39000 
 (0.10278) (0.10963) (0.11377) (0.12889)*** 
Female  1.12208 1.04447 1.11938 1.05985 
 (0.17815)*** (0.18541)*** (0.17828)*** (0.18513)*** 
Pri Enl Mar 0.71093 0.66263 0.73008 0.66736 
 (0.17138)*** (0.18284)*** (0.17141)*** (0.18263)*** 
Age -0.04051 -0.04133 -0.04509 -0.04569 
 (0.02249)* (0.02427)* (0.02256)** (0.02431)* 
Black -0.48529 -0.58109 -0.46204 -0.55119 
 (0.21135)** (0.21991)*** (0.21127)** (0.21943)** 
Other race -0.07333 -0.12257 -0.03358 -0.07529 
 (0.29025) (0.30120) (0.29022) (0.30070) 
Married 0.75890 0.80945 0.75794 0.81155 
 (0.14085)*** (0.15353)*** (0.14073)*** (0.15316)*** 
Divorced 0.89534 0.73531 0.90075 0.72299 
 (0.37206)** (0.39467)* (0.37196)** (0.39413)* 
Widowed 1.53592 1.36881   
 (3.84001) (3.82205)   
TBS FY 98   -1.14750 -0.75354 
   (1.11444) (1.15769) 
TBS FY 99   -0.36429 -0.23312 
   (0.16302)** (0.18081) 
TBS FY 00   -0.11138 0.27316 
   (0.17301) (0.19832) 
TBS FY 01   -0.07456 -0.16663 
   (0.16258) (0.17900) 
TBS FY 03   -0.21177 -0.30212 
   (0.17813) (0.19049) 
TBS FY 04   -0.84872 -1.04925 
   (0.22745)*** (0.23597)*** 
TBS FY 05   -0.27380 -0.85951 
   (0.60363) (0.74479) 
Constant -1.52387 -1.36422 -1.20062 -0.99239 
 (0.55192)*** (0.59677)** (0.57122)** (0.61679) 
Observations 5976 4929 5976 4929 
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